Understanding and threat alignment within a C-IED enterprise

By Paul Amoroso, an explosive hazards specialist at Assessed Mitigation Options (AMO) consultancy

INTRODUCTION

In previous articles published in The Counter-IED Report, the author has advocated for a whole-of- society approach1 to countering the use or threatened use of IEDs through a national Counter-IED (C-IED) enterprise.2 Such approaches necessitate a coordinated effort among stakeholders with complex institutional structures, requiring internal coherence and collaboration to ensure effective C-IED strategies. A clear and shared understanding of the IED threat is essential to effectively coordinate C-IED efforts,3 align them with the specific threat, and optimise resources for both responding to and preventing their use. To be effective, any national C-IED enterprise must first fully understand the problem it aims to counter. This begins with recognizing the current IED threat and anticipating potential future threats. This understanding of the threat will guide the structure and composition of a C-IED enterprise, requiring a careful and strategic selection of stakeholders to ensure its effectiveness. It will also influence the enterprise’s strategic goal along with the C-IED efforts invested in and their objectives. Key entities central to understanding in a C-IED enterprise can include the national lead entity for C-IED, the Office of the National Security Advisor, and various security services.4 The importance of a designated lead entity5 has previously6 been emphasized. It is important to remember no one-size-fits-all and the best fit to lead any national C-IED enterprise will involve consideration of the context, limitations imposed, and importantly the threat.7 The lead entity must monitor and adapt C-IED efforts to the evolving threat landscape.

Understanding is a critical cross-cutting element within any C-IED enterprise and one which has two aspects to it. One is understanding the threat and second is understanding the effectiveness of the C-IED efforts invested in. This article will explore the concept of understanding within a C-IED enterprise and the importance of aligning C-IED efforts with the threat. We will begin by examining the significance of understanding within a C-IED enterprise, highlighting its critical role in the enterprise’s success and the potential risks that arise from its absence. We will then examine the need for and ability to achieve initial and sustained understanding within the enterprise. The importance of a C-IED enterprise remaining threat aligned is shown by examining its importance when personnel need to operate in a high threat IED environment. The evolution of the IED threat has an impact across all elements of the enterprise, which will be illustrated by examining its importance regarding IED component control and C-IED border controls. This is the first in a series of articles examining how to develop and sustain an accurate IED threat picture to optimize understanding and ensure the C-IED efforts invested in remain effective as threats evolve.

UNDERSTANDING WITHIN A C-IED ENTERPRISE

A previous article in The Counter IED Report stated that ‘before you counter a problem, you need to know the problem.’ In the case of C-IED this refers to understanding the use or threatened use of IEDs, so that in time effective and efficient C-IED efforts may be invested in as part of a C-IED enterprise to at least match but ideally overmatch the IED threat.’8

One of the fifteen previously9 proposed elements to form the basis for any national C-IED enterprise, was understanding. Security centric C-IED frameworks often have understanding as the foundation upon which the lines of effort of attack the network, defeat the device, and train the force are built upon.10 As such, understanding within a C-IED enterprise is critical to effectively responding to and ultimately preventing IED use. It can be a challenging element of an enterprise to get right, as it involves more than just having insightful comprehension of the IED threat. It also requires a thorough grasp of all elements of the enterprise to evaluate the effectiveness of all efforts invested in and the overall impact on countering the IED threat. In fact, “the key fundamental C-IED enabling action of ‘understanding’ both the problem and the C-IED efforts invested in, is deemed essential.’11

‘The criticality of understanding in support of any coherent C-IED enterprise is both cross-cutting and multi-dimensional, referring to the need to comprehend inter alia:

  • Why and how IEDs are used;
  • Use of appropriate terminology;
  • What a national C-IED enterprise entails;
  • Maintaining an accurate IED threat picture foreffective C-IED decision making;
  • Role and importance of exploitation in maintainingan accurate IED threat picture;
  • Timely information sharing between C-IEDstakeholders;
  • Appropriate classification of C-IED information.’12

It requires both an initial assessment of the threat and a baseline assessment of existing C-IED elements which can then be used to inform the design and development of a C-IED enterprise. It subsequently requires on-going threat assessment to ensure the C-IED efforts invested in remain threat aligned along with an embedded monitoring, evaluation, and learning (MEL)13 process to inform an understanding of the effectiveness of the C-IED elements invested in. As such, a system to maximise initial and on-going understanding needs to be developed through initial baseline assessments, on-going threat assessment and embedding a MEL process within the enterprise. With a thorough understanding of the threat as well as all of its elements, an enterprise is best positioned to remain threat aligned, effective, and efficient over time.

Evolution of Threat and Effectiveness of C-IED Efforts Invested In

Another article discussing the management of a C-IED enterprise, outlines the need for C-IED activities to be synchronized and unity of effort to be achieved across its constituent C-IED efforts. It stated ‘the temptation to pursue neat and clean synchronisation across C-IED efforts should be avoided, especially that which is rigid and inflexible. There is often a need to simultaneously invest in various C-IED efforts, each with different priorities. Over time, these initial prioritisation requirements will change, necessitating adaptation and further synchronisation. Thus, flexibility is required as the rate at which various C-IED efforts mature to being impactful can vary, the threat can evolve, and the wider security environment can change.’14 This evolution of the IED threat, variation in the effectiveness of C-IED efforts, and changes in the broader security landscape indicate that although an accurate understanding may be achieved during the design and development of an enterprise, this understanding will inevitably need to adapt over time. Therefore, there is a need for both initial and sustained understanding to support a C-IED enterprise.

The Risk Posed by a Lack of Understanding

Employing strategic principles in support of a regionally coherent C-IED enterprise has previously been proposed.15 Several approaches were considered in developing an analysis framework to facilitate the identification of such principles. Through the examination and combination of four such approaches16 a seven-question framework17 was developed to identify optimal C-IED strategic principles for a given IED affected state or region,18 to achieve the required impacts and outcomes from C-IED donor assistance.19 This seven-question framework can equally be applied as a methodology to establish what C-IED efforts need to be invested in by a national enterprise. With the problem statement known,20 the seven question framework21 poses the following questions in terms of countering the use and threatened use of IEDs.

  1. What end-state is desired
  2. What actions are to be taken?
  3. Who are to take the actions?
  4. When are the actions to be taken?
  5. Where are the actions to be taken?
  6. What risks need to be managed?
  7. What resources do the actions require?

The question of ‘what risks need to be managed’ has two aspects to it; namely, what will optimize the likelihood of success of a national C-IED enterprise and secondly what risks need to be mitigated against. Five recurrent risks were identified with the first22 being a lack of understanding within the C-IED enterprise. As such, not only is understanding essential for a C-IED enterprise to be effective, but a lack of understanding also poses a risk to it being effective and ultimately a success but also often leads to a waste of often valuable resources.

The risk arising from a lack of understanding can be minimized through four key steps: conducting an initial threat assessment, establishing a baseline evaluation of existing C-IED efforts, maintaining ongoing threat assessments, and integrating a structured MEL process into the C-IED enterprise. As such, understanding within the C-IED enterprise occurs at two critical junctures: initially and on an ongoing basis to sustain an accurate understanding. When this is done the C-IED efforts invested in can remain threat aligned, and their effectiveness can be monitored and adjusted as required when needed.

INITIAL UNDERSTANDING

During the design and development of a C-IED enterprise, it is necessary to undertake an initial IED threat assessment as well as a baseline assessment23 of the maturity or lack thereof, of existing C-IED efforts being invested in.

Initially Assessing the IED Threat

It is essential to have a clear understanding of the IED threat when designing and developing a C-IED enterprise, to ensure that the enterprise is aligned with the specific threat from the beginning. The methodology adopted or adapted for this initial IED threat assessment is the focus of a series of articles throughout 2025.

Assessing Existing C-IED Capabilities

Initial ‘understanding is informed by a baseline assessment, which compares current C-IED capabilities to those required to achieve the planned C-IED enterprise.’24 Such a baseline assessment can determine ‘the maturity or lack thereof, of the key elements which contribute to a C-IED enterprise.’25 The seven-questions framework can be adapted to determine the most effective C-IED efforts for the enterprise to invest in. These efforts can then be evaluated against current efforts to identify the necessary level of investment to achieve the desired outcomes. This process may also highlight new C-IED efforts that require investment. A more common approach to undertaking a national C-IED baseline assessment is to use the UNIDIR C-IED CMM self-assessment tool26 or adaptations of this.

SUSTAINED UNDERSTANDING

Once the findings of the initial threat assessment and baseline assessment are assimilated into a C-IED enterprise, the most appropriate C-IED efforts can be invested in and prioritized as part of a broader strategic plan. Once operationalized, the C-IED enterprise needs to be managed with the objectives of remaining threat aligned, effective and efficient, which ‘collectively present a challenge to typical linear, rigid management practices, necessitating the need for flexibility.’27 A flexible C-IED enterprise is one that is agile28 that can effectively respond to and ultimately prevent IED incidents. One of the 15 elements proposed as the basis for a C-IED enterprise is adapting C-IED efforts. Adaptation of the enterprise is necessary owing to the evolution of the threat and changes in the effectiveness of the C-IED efforts invested in. To support such adaptation, there is a need for internal mechanisms to monitor, evaluate and feedback lessons identified into the enterprise in relation to both the IED threat as it evolves as well as the effectiveness of the C-IED efforts invested in.

Evaluating Effectiveness and Adaptation

Integrating a Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning (MEL) process within the C-IED enterprise serves as a tool to assess and improve the effectiveness of C-IED efforts. It enables the identification of lessons that guide necessary adaptations to enhance impact. Additionally, the MEL process strengthens oversight by tracking the progress of C-IED initiatives, ensuring they remain aligned with objectives or highlighting areas requiring adjustment. This, in turn, can contribute to a more efficient C-IED enterprise by optimizing the use of invested resources. As monitoring and evaluation of the effectiveness of C-IED efforts can identify lessons, informed decisions to ‘modify existing or invest in new C-IED efforts,’29 are empowered. Once ‘political backing to modify the enterprise’30 is secured, ‘an efficient process, involving key stakeholder engagement, resource mobilization31 and communication, is needed to ensure the resulting constituent C-IED efforts within the enterprise remain threat aligned, effective and efficient.’32 As such, embedding a MEL process into a C-IED enterprise is a key tool to achieving an agile enterprise.

Maintaining Awareness of Evolving IED Threats

While the effectiveness of the C-IED efforts invested in will be determined by a number of factors,33 the IED threat will be the primary one. Parallel to an embedded lessons learned process; threat monitoring needs to be on-going to detect changes in IED use and horizon scan.

‘An IED threat is normally an evolving and dynamic problem’34 as the threat being confronted will evolve over time in terms of the technical complexity and tactical sophistication as the IED network employing them will seek to circumvent the C-IED efforts invested against them. For this reason, it is important to acknowledge an IED threat typically evolves due to the action-reaction- counteraction cycle that plays out between IED threat actors and those engaged in a C-IED enterprise. Whatever approach is taken by a national C-IED enterprise, the fact that the threat will inevitably evolve due to the action-reaction- counteraction cycle, the C-IED efforts invested in need to remain agile.

The requirement for C-IED efforts to be agile, implicitly requires the C-IED enterprise to monitor their effectiveness and evaluate them to ensure they remain threat aligned.35 Monitoring and evaluation of the effectiveness of the C-IED efforts invested in can detect IED threat evolution;36 however, the primary means by which IED threat evolution can be detected is by dedicated efforts to maintain awareness of likely evolution in the IED threat. This requires ongoing monitoring of the IED threat, enabling timely adjustments to keep the enterprise threat aligned and agile.

Threat monitoring is intended to detect both threat evolution as well as horizon scan for emerging threats.37 Timely C-IED intelligence products are the outputs from effective threat monitoring. These C-IED intelligence products should ideally provide feedback, through a collaborative information sharing culture, to the stakeholder community involved to ensure the efforts invested in and their respective prioritization remain threat aligned.

This stakeholder community can then use the information provided by such intelligence products, to update or change the IED threat picture, so that it remains threat aligned. By having within a C-IED enterprise an embedded MEL process, as well as an effective threat monitoring system, informed decisions, effective responses, and ultimately preventative measures, can be invested in and, when necessary, adjusted.38

THREAT ALIGNMENT IN HIGH THREAT IED ENVIRONMENTS

The need for timely and threat aligned C-IED capabilities are essential when ‘security force and defence force personnel are required to operate in a high threat IED environment.’39 These personnel ‘will need to be provided with suitable threat aligned IED awareness and training which may be considered specialised preparation and can include the provision of certain specialised C-IED equipment. Examples of this include intermediate search capabilities such as route search, the use of electronic countermeasures (ECM) equipment or what may be considered level 1 exploitation. The aim of C-IED specialist preparation is to appropriately train and equip all those required to undertake key activities within any national C-IED enterprise. Such key C-IED activities include, inter alia, information management and threat picture development as part of understanding efforts as well as defeat the device activities, and exploitation activities.’40

THREAT ALIGNMENT OF IED COMPONENT CONTROL AND C-IED BORDER CONTROLS

Two of the preventative C-IED elements previously outlined are IED component control and border controls. Both need to be threat aligned at all times to be effective and are closely related in many of the C-IED efforts they support. IED component control involves developing and implementing measures to regulate and control access to IED components. These control measures may target explosive precursor chemicals deemed a threat due to their assessed risk of being used in the manufacture of improvised explosives. They may also be used to control access to switches identified as components in IEDs. Any state security entity with a role in identifying such chemicals or components, developing appropriate control measures, their implementation and enforcement will need to be involved in this element of a national enterprise.

Police or other law enforcement agencies may have primary responsibility for investigating and enforcing such controls domestically. It may also involve, border management authorities, particularly those with customs responsibilities required to monitor and enforce regulations related to the international movement of certain controlled IED components into or from the state. Wider border security entities may also be required to be on the lookout for and trained to identify the illicit movement of IEDs, components thereof as well as IED network personnel. They may also be trained and equipped to take appropriate safe action upon discovery of any suspected items or personnel. As such, border control is a key element in any national C-IED enterprise.

On-going monitoring of the chemicals and components in use in IEDs will be necessary to ensure evolution in the threat is detected. Subsequent appropriate adjustment in the required regulation and control measures will need to be put in place. These adjustments will then need to be communicated to those who need to implement and enforce them, which may also entail training in new procedures or associated equipment.

CONCLUSION

Understanding is a vital cross-cutting element of any C-IED enterprise, encompassing two key aspects: the threat itself and the effectiveness of the C-IED efforts invested in. To achieve effective understanding, it must be initially established during the design phase to guide the development of a national C-IED enterprise and subsequently sustained over time. Initial understanding requires an initial IED threat assessment as well as a baseline assessment of existing C-IED capabilities. Sustained understanding requires monitoring the evolving IED threat as well as assessing the effectiveness of C-IED efforts invested in. The importance of ensuring all C-IED efforts remain threat-aligned and efficient has been emphasized, with their efficiency depending on maintaining this alignment. However, as an IED system evolves to circumvent the C-IED efforts invested in against it, the IED threat is constantly evolving making this a dynamic and challenging endeavour. Despite these challenges, the C-IED enterprise needs to adapt, to ensure ‘firstly it remains threat aligned, secondly the C-IED efforts invested in are optimised to support the overarching strategic goal of the enterprise and thirdly, to work efficiently and effectively within the resources provided to the enterprise.’41

Such adaptation is only possible through an embedded MEL process to inform an understanding of the effectiveness of the C-IED efforts invested in. It also requires on-going threat monitoring to detect changes in the threat and horizon scan for emerging threats. The ability to systematically undertake an initial threat assessment and to threat monitor on an ongoing basis requires the development and sustainment of an IED threat picture. Subsequent articles over the course of 2025 will examine how to develop and sustain an accurate IED threat picture to optimize understanding and ensure the C-IED efforts invested in remain effective as threats evolve.■

FOOTNOTES
  1. A whole-of-society approach to C-IED is a comprehensive approach to C-IED involving a broad array of stakeholders contributing to a C-IED enterprise. It can include multiple elements of state security, defence, government departments, ministries, offices, and agencies along with civil society organisations, commercial and industry entities as well as international and regional organizations. Whole-of-society C-IED approaches often have stakeholders with complex institutional structures and procedures requiring internal coherence, a cooperative and collaborative culture between members to support effective C-IED efforts through a shared understanding of the IED threat faced. Source: Managing a C-IED Enterprise, The Counter-IED Report, Winter 2024/25.
  2. A C-IED enterprise refers to the collective efforts aimed at countering IED threats. It can involve anything which is intended to predict, discover or detect, prevent, protect against, respond to or neutralise, recover from or exploit, mitigate against, or deter IED attacks.
  3. C-IED efforts may be responsive, preventative or cross-cutting in nature. Such efforts include, inter alia, legal instruments, training, mentoring, advice, operational and tactical or technical assistance, technology and equipment provision, intelligence activities, investigations and actions against an IED system, interagency and international cooperation, control of explosives and other IED components as well as any other investment made to respond to and ultimately prevent IED use. Source: Managing a C-IED Enterprise, The Counter-IED Report, Winter 2024/25.
  4. Source: Building the C-IED Enterprise to Counter the IED System, The Counter-IED Report, Winter 2023/24.
  5. In a previous article of this publication, Colonel H R Naidu Gade, spoke of the need to designate what is called a nodal agency, “to coordinate and track progress across all the agencies at national, state, and local levels toward building the C-IED capabilities. It should facilitate harnessing the innovative potential of the research and development organizations to meet a dynamic, complex, and adaptive threat and to promote an informed and agile research and acquisitions process that stays ahead of the threat and develops timely and effective C-IED systems and solutions.” Source: India – The National Counter-IED Strategy, The Counter-IED Report, Winter 2023/ 2024, by Colonel H R Naidu Gade (Retd), pp. 40.
  6. Necessity of a Designated Lead Entity within National C-IED Enterprises, The Counter-IED Report, Spring/Summer 2024.
  7. Necessity of a Designated Lead Entity within National C-IED Enterprises, The Counter-IED Report, Spring/Summer 2024.
  8. Understanding and Maximising C-IED Information Sharing, The Counter-IED Report, Autumn 2023.
  9. Building the C-IED Enterprise to Counter the IED System, The Counter-IED Report, Winter 2023/24.
  10. These three lines of effort are captured within the fifteen elements, outlined in Building the C-IED Enterprise to Counter the IED System, The Counter-IED Report, Winter 2023/24.
  11. A Strategic Principles Approach to Regional C-IED Enterprises, The Counter IED Report, Spring/Summer 2023.
  12. Understanding and Maximising C-IED Information Sharing, The Counter-IED Report, Autumn 2023.
  13. ‘Monitoring and evaluation within a C-IED enterprise involves observation and documentation of the C-IED efforts invested in, followed by the subsequent evaluation of their impact on the IED threat. This process of observation and analysis is intended to identify lessons for each of the C-IED efforts invested in.’ Source: Managing a C-IED Enterprise, The Counter-IED Report, Winter 2024/25 edition.
  14. Managing a C-IED Enterprise, The Counter-IED Report, Winter 2024/25 edition.
  15. A Strategic Principles Approach to Regional C-IED Enterprises, The Counter-IED Report, Spring/Summer 2023.
  16. These four approaches involved identifying ends, ways and means; considering the situation, task, execution, authority, and support demands; examining what, why, who, where, when and how (5W+H) of the problem; and a generic set of seven questions which may be applied to any planning scenario which is adapted from the military seven question estimate.
  17. The seven-question framework presented previously uses seven questions to establish what C-IED strategic principles best suit a given IED affected region to achieve the required impacts and outcomes from C-IED donor assistance; however, it can equally be applied as methodology to establish what C-IED efforts need to be invested in by a national C-IED enterprise.
  18. Such principles can serve as the foundation for reasoning and decision-making about how IED affected states, their regional organisations, and international organisations providing C-IED donor assistance can respond strategically to the threat posed by IEDs. The desired end state for such principles is that they support the development of coherent C-IED enterprises to at least match, but ideally overmatch, the threat posed by IEDs. Source: C-IED Strategic Principles for East Africa, The Counter-IED Report, Autumn 2023.
  19. C-IED donor assistance refers to C-IED support provided on a bilateral basis, on a joint initiative from two or more States or by an international organisation, e.g., EU, League of Arab States, ECOWAS etc or an alliance e.g. NATO, to an IED affected state or region. Source: Is Implementation of Western C-IED Enterprises Suitable When Providing Donor C-IED Assistance, The Counter-IED Report, Spring/Summer 2023; C-IED Strategic Principles for East Africa, The Counter-IED Report, Autumn 2023; Necessity of a Designated Lead Entity within National C-IED Enterprises, The Counter-IED Report, Spring/Summer 2024.
  20. In the development of the seven-question framework the starting point was consideration of ‘what is the situation and how does it affect us?’ This provides the problem statement being addressed. In this case, we have the starting assumption that an IED threat exists in a given region, state or locality requiring an IED affected state or number of states to engage in a C- IED enterprise. As this problem statement is known, no such question needs to be included in the analysis.
  21. This framework uses seven questions to establish what C-IED strategic principles best suit a given IED affected region to achieve the required impacts and outcomes from C-IED donor assistance.
  22. Others included, lack of coherence, coordination and cooperation often leading to unnecessary competition and waste of resources amongst stakeholders; lack of power of enforcement to compel stakeholders to engage effectively in the C-IED enterprise; and finally, the risk of some C-IED efforts having negative counterproductive effects which overall damage the C-IED enterprise.
  23. Phases within a C-IED Enterprise, The Counter-IED Report, Autumn 2024.
  24. Building the C-IED Enterprise to Counter the IED System, The Counter-IED Report, Winter 2023/24.
  25. A Conceptual Framework for C-IED Enterprise Design, The Counter-IED Report, Autumn 2024.
  26. https://unidir.org/publication/counter-ied-capability-maturity-model-and-self-assessment-tool
  27. Managing a C-IED Enterprise, The Counter-IED Report, Winter 2024/25
  28. This need for agile C-IED responses is discussed in ‘Agile C-IED Enterprises’, The Counter-IED Report, Winter 2024/25.
  29. Managing a C-IED Enterprise, The Counter-IED Report, Winter 2024 / 25 edition.
  30. Managing a C-IED Enterprise, The Counter-IED Report, Winter 2024 / 25 edition.
  31. Resource investment will need to be considered over the medium to long term as the various efforts invested in will need to be maintained and probably modified as the IED threat evolves and the C-IED enterprise needs to be adapted, so that its stays threat aligned and continues to invest in the most appropriate ways under the legal framework it is required to operate. Source: Necessity of a Designated Lead Entity within National C-IED Enterprises, The Counter-IED Report, Spring/Summer 2024.
  32. Managing a C-IED Enterprise, The Counter-IED Report, Winter 2024/25.
  33. These factors included ‘the rate at which various C-IED efforts mature to being impactful can vary, the threat can evolve, and the wider security environment can change.’ Source: Managing a C-IED Enterprise, The Counter-IED Report, Winter 2024/25.
  34. Understanding and Maximising C-IED Information Sharing, The Counter-IED Report, Autumn 2023.
  35. A Conceptual Framework for C-IED Enterprise Design, The Counter-IED Report, Autumn 2024.
  36. A Conceptual Framework for C-IED Enterprise Design, The Counter-IED Report, Autumn 2024.
  37. Source: Regulating control of threat explosive precursor chemicals for use in improvised explosives, Background paper, Prepared by Paul Amoroso and Manon Blancafort for the Small Arms Survey, 20th January 2025.
  38. Source: Regulating control of threat explosive precursor chemicals for use in improvised explosives, Background paper, Prepared by Paul Amoroso and Manon Blancafort for the Small Arms Survey, 20th January 2025.
  39. Nesting C-IED Appropriately Within a State’s National Security Architecture, The Counter-IED Report, Spring/Summer 2024.
  40. Nesting C-IED Appropriately Within a State’s National Security Architecture, The Counter-IED Report, Spring/Summer 2024.
  41. Managing a C-IED Enterprise, The Counter-IED Report, Winter 2024/25.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Paul Amoroso is an explosive hazards specialist and has extensive experience as an IED Threat Mitigation Policy Advisor working in East and West Africa. He served in the Irish Army as an IED Disposal and CBRNe officer, up to MNT level, and has extensive tactical, operational, and strategic experience in Peacekeeping Operations in Africa and the Middle East. He has experience in the development of doctrine and policy and was one of the key contributors to the United Nations Improvised Explosive Device Disposal Standards and the United Nations Explosive Ordnance Disposal Military Unit Manual. He works at present in the MENA region on SALW control as well as in wider Africa advising on national and regional C-IED strategies. He has a MSc in Explosive Ordnance Engineering and an MA in Strategic Studies. He runs a consultancy, Assessed Mitigation Options (AMO), which provides advice, support, and training delivery in EOD, C-IED, WAM as well as Personal Security Awareness Training (PSAT) and Hostile Environment Awareness Training (HEAT). This article reflects his own views and not necessarily those of any organisation he has worked for or with in developing these ideas.
LinkedIn profile: https://www.linkedin.com/in/paul-amoroso-msc-ma-miexpe-60a63a42/

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