Nesting C-IED Appropriately within a State’s National Security Architecture

By Paul Amoroso, an explosive hazards specialist at Assessed Mitigation Options (AMO) consultancy

INTRODUCTION

The author has previously advocated for a Whole of Society approach to C-IED when investing in, sustaining and when necessary, over time adapting a national C-IED enterprise¹. A whole of society approach to national C-IED is a comprehensive one and may include multiple elements of state security, defence, government departments, ministries, offices, and agencies along with civil society organisations, commercial and industry entities as well as international and regional organizations. Such a whole of society approach is intended to ensure all stakeholders who have a role to play in responding to and ultimately preventing the use of IEDs, have input into the national C-IED enterprise which is ultimately required to at least match but ideally overmatch the use of IEDs and remove them as a threat to security, development and prosperity of the State. It has previously been advocated for the need to guard against overly security centric approaches to C-IED; however, national defence and security elements will always have a key role to play in any national C-IED enterprise.

The emergence of C-IED from Iraq and Afghanistan, resulted in it being viewed through a battlefield lens, making C-IED a militarized mission and inspiring military solutions, not particularly suited to support C-IED enterprises based on the rule of law and a criminal justice approach. One key informant when researching this topic stated, “militaries go to war and war is devoid of criminal justice thinking.” ² The dominance of military centric approaches by national C-IED enterprises, was highlighted by the same key informant, having worked to coordinate international C-IED assistance³ in East Africa, observing that in many cases it involved bilateral or military to military engagements rather than involvement of law enforcement agencies such as their police, hampering a criminal justice approach to C-IED. The author would advocate for a criminal justice approach to countering the use of IEDs which operates within the rule of law and endeavours, whenever possible, to prosecute the IED system⁴ through judicial processes and supporting intelligence led operations; however, it is also acknowledged that this may not always be achievable. While some may claim “a criminal justice approach to strategic national C-IED, is essential,” ⁵ many IED affected states will have an underdeveloped security and judicial system, which cannot move immediately to take such an approach. Instead, a progressive transition to allow the required structures, skillsets and capabilities to be developed is needed. IED affected states may also lack the required legislative instruments, government policies or legal powers needed to empower a rule of law approach to prosecute the IED system.

Depending on its security context, national security architecture, maturity of its legal system and the IED threat faced by a state, it is acknowledged that it may be necessary to have an initial focus on responsive C-IED efforts and later evolve to an appropriate balanced mixture of responsive and preventative C-IED efforts. The C-IED which emerged from Iraq and Afghanistan was as much a military industrial enterprise as it was a security, stabilization, or development endeavor. Initial US efforts in developing C-IED were focussed on right of boom but in time they moved more to looking left of boom. To go left of boom, C-IED efforts need a greater law enforcement or paramilitary approach than a military centric approach.⁶ Libya’s development of national C-IED capabilities provides a good example of the transition from a military dominated approach to a criminal justice approach to C-IED led by law enforcement.” ⁷

Using this paradigm of how a national C-IED enterprise may evolve, it is clear that many elements of a state’s security architecture will play a central and key role in the C-IED efforts⁸ invested in, sustained, and adapted over time. As IEDs are but one of many weapon systems that present a security issue within a state, the author proposes that it is necessary to adapt the C-IED enterprise that is developed, sustained, and adapted over time to fit within a state’s established national security infrastructure and not the other way around. Such an approach will allow the security and defence aspects of a national C-IED enterprise to ideally fit within existing capabilities and structures to complement and improve wider state defence and security capabilities and avoid unnecessary duplication and potential competition for resources and issues related to the sharing of information. This paper will seek to examine how any national C-IED enterprise needs to be appropriately nested within a State’s national security architecture.

C-IED AS A WIDER NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUE

The transition of C-IED from a security centric responsive approach to later evolve into an appropriate balanced mixture of responsive and preventative C-IED efforts has been outlined. As C-IED evolves, it needs to become integrated as part of wider security strategies, an element of which may be a sizeable component thereof depending on the prevailing IED threat. IED affected states are likely to face multiple security challenges simultaneously which often leads them to require external C-IED assistance. Previous research by the author,⁹ identified that in many cases, donor nations prefer investment in security initiatives which are associated with a suitable national strategy. This can result in an IED affected state having several security related strategies at the same time. This can then lead to the need for consolidation of security related strategies, in which C-IED may not get its own standalone strategy but may need to come under a wider strategy. Even in the case that an IED affected state is not receiving notable external C-IED assistance, it is good practice to consider how a C-IED enterprise may come under wider security strategies. As such, national C-IED enterprises may fall under broader national security strategies¹⁰ such as counterinsurgency, counterterrorism¹¹ or an overall national security strategy. Nesting C-IED within a broader national security, defence or development strategy that best fits the aspirations of an IED affected state maximises synergies allowing the reinforcing of common complementary good practices related to various security threats thus avoiding unnecessary replication or siloing. Such efficiencies are even more critical in resource limited developing nations. However, should C-IED come under a broader national security, defence or development strategy, it is necessary to ensure the requisite expertise to address IED use, is part of such strategy development and its subsequent implementation.

DEFINING A STATE’S NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

In the context of this paper, national security architecture refers to all entities involved in the provision of public safety and national security belonging to the official, legitimate domain of the security forces of the state, who operate under state governance, along with their respective roles, duties, responsibilities and capabilities and their associated interrelationships. The exact make-up of the national security architecture for a given state will be unique in each case. For this reason, the expression ‘context is king’ is apt when considering how best to nest C-IED appropriately within a state’s security architecture. While acknowledging context is king, entities which may form part of a state security architecture include inter alia, defence forces and all their branches within the land, air, maritime, and cyber domains, along with civilian police; presidential guards; intelligence services; border guards; reserve or local security units; civil defence units; national guards and government militias.¹² Added considerations, include the prevailing IED threat and the legal framework under which the state chooses to address their use as well as the relationship between the various security elements involved in C-IED and how they work together. Various legal frameworks under which C-IED is undertaken can include a combat engineering approach, a counterinsurgency approach, a counterterrorism approach or a criminal justice approach. Each of these has its own nuances which need to be understood. Whichever legal framework C-IED is undertaken, will influence what security and defence entities within a state may be involved in a national C-IED enterprise.

STATE’S NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHITECTURE ENTITIES INVOLVED IN C-IED

Various efforts are required as part of a national C-IED enterprise, which can in general be considered as preventative, responsive, or cross-cutting in how they address the use or threatened use of IEDs. The author proposed in a previous paper, published in The Counter IED Report, fifteen elements as the basis for a national C-IED enterprise.¹³ Given in the table below are these fifteen elements with a description of potential security or defence entities which could be required to undertake the activities associated with each along with considerations for roles, duties, responsibilities and inter-relationships.

Cross-cutting C-IED elements
Understanding	Various intelligence agencies and entities, including internal domestic as well as foreign, in particular all those who may contribute to developing and maintaining an accurate IED threat picture.
Preparation	The preventative C-IED element of ‘preparation,’ refers to all efforts within a state to best make ready, the population, security and defence personnel, as well as C-IED specialists, so that they are best positioned to effectively prevent and if necessary, respond to IED events. All training providers within the state’s security infrastructure involved in any aspects of these C-IED activities will have a role in preparation. Depending on the legal framework under which the C-IED enterprise is being undertaken, preparation of the population may involve the security or defence forces undertaking information operations to engage the population with appropriate IED awareness and C-IED knowledge. The aim of preparation of security and defence personnel is to provide appropriate C-IED education and training to security force, defence, front line and first responder personnel who may encounter or be called to the scene of an IED event. The intent is for them to be appropriately knowledgeable of what to be aware of and be on the lookout for, by being able to identify potential IEDs, components thereof or explosive precursor chemicals.They should also be trained in how to safely react, which may involve clearing the immediate danger area of all personnel, noting details of the suspicious item(s) and reporting them to specialists to respond to. It may also extend to the provision of, and training on, certain equipment such as metal detectors or other types of C-IED detection equipment. Security force and defence force personnel who are required to operate in a high threat IED environment will need to be provided with suitable threat aligned IED awareness and training which may include the provision of certain C-IED equipment and may be considered as specialist preparation. Examples of this include intermediate search capabilities such as route search, the use of electronic countermeasures (ECM) equipment or what may be considered level 1 exploitation. The aim of C-IED specialist preparation is to appropriately train and equip all those required to undertake key activities within any national C-IED enterprise. Such key C-IED activities include, inter alia, information management and threat picture development as part of understanding efforts as well as defeat the device activities, and exploitation activities. Within militaries, ‘preparation’ comes under the ‘prepare the force’ line of operations that many use as their C-IED model. In this context, it is expanded to include all elements of the state involved in a C-IED enterprise not just the military and is explicitly beyond specialist C-IED roles to include non-specialists and the wider population.
Interagency and international cooperation	All entities within a nation’s security architecture who are involved in a national C-IED enterprise, will need to have appropriate liaison and interaction mechanisms established with the other entities involved in C-IED ensuring such activities are optimised and wastage of resources is minimised. A secure information sharing culture needs to be fostered that supports the timely exchange of information between all entities who need it to empower informed decision making. Similarly, some of the state security entities involved in C-IED will need to engage in various agreed fora with international partners, neighbouring states or regional organisations. This engagement may be directly or through support for a designated lead entity with this responsibility, such as a foreign intelligence agency or a department / ministry for foreign affairs.
Information management	All security and defence entities within a national C-IED enterprise, will need to have appropriate information exchange and storage infrastructure in place to support the secure and timely exchange of C-IED information with all other C-IED stakeholders who need access to the information to empower informed decision making. This may also involve various fora established to develop, maintain and monitor the IED threat picture such as an IED information fusion centre.
Adapting C-IED efforts	All security and defence entities involved in C-IED, will need to have internal mechanisms to monitor, evaluate and feedback lessons identified into the national C-IED enterprise in relation to: IED threat C-IED efforts it is involved in delivering

Preventative C-IED elements
Strategy, policy, regulations, and legislation	All state security entities involved in C-IED, ideally need to be consulted with, during the development of any strategy, policies, regulations or legislation they will be required to operate under. Ideally, whenever possible, existing strategies, policies, regulations and legislation should be engaged and adapted, if necessary, for C-IED purposes, to harness the benefit provided by using existing practices, processes and procedures.
Control and security of explosives	All state security and defence entities with any type of explosive ordnance need to ensure they engage with the state’s laid down procedures designed to control and secure them.
IED component controls	Any state security entities with a role to play in developing or implementing the measures established to control access to IED components will need to be involved. Such control measures may be related to explosive precursor chemicals identified as a threat owing to the assessed risk of their use in the manufacture of improvised explosives or may be related to switches identified as being used in IEDs. This may involve, border management authorities with responsibility for monitoring and enforcing regulations related to the international movement of such controlled items into or from the state. Similarly, police or other law enforcement agencies may have primary responsibility for investigating and enforcing such controls domestically.
Border controls	Border management authorities, particularly those with customs responsibilities may be required to monitor and enforce regulations related to the international movement of certain controlled IED components into or from the state. This may relate to threat explosive precursor chemicals which may be subject to controlled access and associated importation and export controls. Wider border security entities may also be required to be on the lookout for and trained to identify the illicit movement of IEDs, components thereof as well as IED network personnel. They may also be trained and equipped to take appropriate safe action upon discovery of any suspected items or personnel.
Intelligence led operations	C-IED intelligence led operations can be executed against the network personnel, the processes involved and the supply of materiel that an IED system requires to function. Various intelligence, security service and investigation entities within a state’s security architecture will be involved in the planning of such operations. Police, paramilitary, security service or defence personnel are typically involved in operations against IED network personnel. Examples of how the processes that support an IED system may have intelligence led operations mounted against them could include operations to target those involved in the financing, radicalisation / indoctrination, or provision of technical knowledge to IED network personnel either in person or through the internet. Intelligence led operations against IED system processes done through the internet, will involve cyber security agencies. Similarly various security entities can be involved in operations against the supply of materiel of IED components, with border security agencies often one of those. In some States, the use of intelligence to proactively degrade the effectiveness of IED networks is a C-IED line of operation known as “attack the network”. Attack the network seeks to proactively degrade an IED network through offensive actions and activities designed to reduce the effects and interrupt an IED systems’ activities. Other C-IED terms which are sometimes used, are engage the network and degrade the network.

Responsive C-IED elements
Defeat the device¹⁴	In many states, it will be the military and or the police who provide most of the defeat the device capabilities such as conventional munitions disposal (CMD), IED disposal (IEDD), search and electronic countermeasures (ECM) when needed. In the case of ECM; however this can often involve a nexus between state security, intelligence, exploitation and end user entities and as such can involve many security entities.
Exploitation	In most cases, a state will have either their technical military branches or their police investigation and associated forensic branches lead their exploitation efforts. If a state has its military involved in exploitation, it is possible they will do so under the umbrella of weapons technical intelligence (WTI).
Investigation	State security elements involved in defeat the device and exploitation activities will have a role in either leading or supporting the investigation of IED incidents and the IED system responsible. Such activities will be undertaken to support understanding as well as intelligence led operations and or judicial processes.
Judicial processes	Whenever, judicial processes are pursued within a national C-IED enterprise, all security or defence entities involved in handling or processing IED incident evidence or information and related investigation need to do so in line with the legal requirements within the state for such items to be submissible to the state’s court system.
Victim assistance	State security entities involved in monitoring the IED threat may need to establish relations with those who treat and care for IED victims to ensure an accurate IED threat picture is maintained. By monitoring the injuries sustained by IED victims, understanding of the IED threat can be enhanced which in turn supports all other elements within the C-IED enterprise. Similarly, those involved in the exploitation of IED incidents can provide information to those involved in IED victim assistance in terms of the threat which is faced.

DETERMINING WHICH STATE SECURITY AND DEFENCE ENTITIES WILL BE MEMBERS OF A NATIONAL C-IED ENTERPRISE

Ideally, after a state has an informed understanding of the IED threat it faces and determined the priority of C-IED elements it is going to invest in as part of its national enterprise along with the legal framework under it will operate, generic stakeholder mapping allows all potential members within its national C-IED stakeholder community to be identified. Such generic stakeholder mapping will identify both security and defence entities along with other entities who may be involved. The various security and defence entities who are identified may have overlap in the roles, duties and responsibilities they are aligned with, i.e. more than one state entity may be able to fulfil certain C-IED roles. As such assignment of roles, duties and responsibilities for each of the required security or defence related C-IED activities need to consider which entity has the most mature capability to directly take on such roles. Alternatively, it may be necessary to identify which entities are best positioned to undergo investment to adapt to take on such roles in the shortest time. This is intended to minimise duplication and maximise utility of existing practices, processes and procedures as well as harnessing existing capabilities. In the case of harnessing existing capabilities, due consideration is needed to identify any expansion in capacity in terms of increasing financial or other resources if an entity is being given additional C-IED taskings on top of existing security and defence tasks.

CONCLUSION

It has been outlined how national C-IED enterprises have often been military centric endeavours, but that ideally, criminal justice approaches to C-IED are preferable in ultimately attempting to prevent IED use. However, these are often not initially possible requiring a gradual transition overtime from military to criminal justice approaches to C-IED. Overall, a whole of society approach to C-IED is advocated, with many elements of the state security architecture playing a central role in the C-IED efforts invested in, sustained, and adapted over time. As IEDs are but one security issue that a state’s defense and security elements must contend with, it is important that the C-IED enterprise established is adapted to fit within the existing state security architecture. While some adaptation, such as specific C-IED skill set and expertise development, may be necessary within an existing state security architecture, the intent should be to complement and improve wider state defence and security capabilities and avoid unnecessary duplication and potentially competition for resources along with issues related to information sharing. Wherever C-IED within a State’s security architecture is nested will be nuanced on how IEDs are being used in each context and the maturity of the national security and justice system within the IED affected state i.e. there is no, one size that fits all. ■

FOOTNOTES

A C-IED enterprise is the collective term to describe all initiatives, activities, assistance, capabilities and capacities that contribute to the C-IED efforts intended to at least match but ideally overmatch the threat posed by the use or threatened use of IEDs. It can involve anything which is intended to predict discover or detect, prevent, protect against, respond to or neutralise, recover from or exploit, mitigate against, or deter IED attacks.
Key informant interview conducted by author as part of research into C-IED strategic principles for East Africa – Identifying Counter Improvised Explosive Device Strategic Principles for East Africa, Paul Amoroso, MA Strategic Studies Thesis, National University of Ireland, Cork, School of History, September 2022.
Various forms of C-IED support that an IED affected state can receive from a donor which can include inter alia, training, mentoring, advising, accompanying, assisting, technology and equipment provision and intelligence support.
An IED system is the combination of people, processes and material that go into supporting, funding, procuring, manufacturing, transporting, targeting, preparing, emplacing, executing and publicising any element of an IED attack, including the indoctrination, training and life support of the persons involved.
Key informant interview conducted by author as part of research into C-IED strategic principles for East Africa – Identifying Counter Improvised Explosive Device Strategic Principles for East Africa, Paul Amoroso, MA Strategic Studies Thesis, National University of Ireland, Cork, School of History, September 2022.
Source: Identifying Counter Improvised Explosive Device Strategic Principles for East Africa, Paul Amoroso, MA Strategic Studies Thesis, National University of Ireland, Cork, School of History, September 2022.
Key informant interview conducted by author as part of research into C-IED strategic principles for East Africa – Identifying Counter Improvised Explosive Device Strategic Principles for East Africa, Paul Amoroso, MA Strategic Studies Thesis, National University of Ireland, Cork, School of History, September 2022.
C-IED efforts refer to all initiatives, activities, assistance, capabilities and capacities that collectively make up a C-IED enterprise. C-IED efforts can include, inter alia, training, mentoring, advising, accompanying, assisting, technology and equipment provision and intelligence support.
Author’s MA in strategic studies which examined and identified C-IED strategic principles for East Africa – Identifying Counter Improvised Explosive Device Strategic Principles for East Africa, Paul Amoroso, MA Strategic Studies Thesis, National University of Ireland, Cork, School of History, September 2022.
A national security strategy or policy refers to a formal strategy that involves all decision and activities about the security sector which affect the states and societies external and internal security. It includes both policy and statements and the measures to implement those policy statements. Source: SSR in a Nutshell, Manual for Introductory Training on SSR, DCAF/ ISSAT 2012
During previous research on this subject, one key informant stated that “when C-IED is placed under CT security initiatives it can often serve to scare some key stakeholders off from engaging with it.” “Polarized positions can be taken by key stakeholders involved on issues such as the difference between C-IED and CT as well as their nuances within wider security initiatives.” “For this reason, it is often prudent to avoid having C-IED under broader CT security initiatives. One of the main reasons for this is that it is often very challenging to separate the human elements of CT from the technical elements required to support C-IED.” Source: Identifying Counter Improvised Explosive Device Strategic Principles for East Africa, Paul Amoroso, MA Strategic Studies Thesis, National University of Ireland, Cork, School of History, September 2022.
Source: SSR in a Nutshell, Manual for Introductory Training on SSR, DCAF/ISSAT 2012.
The Counter IED Report, Autumn 2023, pp. 15 – 21, ISSN 2050-6732 (Print) ISSN 2050-6740 (Online)
Defeat the device refers to a defensive line of operation involving a suite of responsive C-IED efforts which include all actions and activities designed to reduce the number of or the effect of IED initiations. Many C-IED efforts can be considered defeat the device activities, including, mobility planning advice; and Force Protection (FP) advice; search activities; route clearance package capabilities; Conventional Munitions Disposal (CMD) activities; Electronic Countermeasure (ECM) assets; and Improvised Explosive Device Disposal (IEDD) activities.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Paul Amoroso is an explosive hazards specialist and has extensive experience as an IED Threat Mitigation Policy Advisor working in East and West Africa. He served in the Irish Army as an IED Disposal and CBRNe officer, up to MNT level, and has extensive tactical, operational, and strategic experience in Peacekeeping Operations in Africa and the Middle East. He has experience in the development of doctrine and policy and was one of the key contributors to the United Nations Improvised Explosive Device Disposal Standards and the United Nations Explosive Ordnance Disposal Military Unit Manual. He works at present in the MENA region on SALW control as well as in wider Africa advising on national and regional C-IED strategies. He has a MSc in Explosive Ordnance Engineering and an MA in Strategic Studies. He runs a consultancy, Assessed Mitigation Options (AMO), which provides advice, support, and training delivery in EOD, C-IED, WAM as well as Personal Security Awareness Training (PSAT) and Hostile Environment Awareness Training (HEAT). This article reflects his own views and not necessarily those of any organisation he has worked for or with in developing these ideas.
Linkedin profile: https://www.linkedin.com/in/paul-amoroso-msc-ma-miexpe-60a63a42/

Download PDF: 35-41 – Paul Amoroso article – Nesting C-IED Appropriately Within a State’s National Security Architecture – Counter-IED Report Spring-Summer 2024

Counter-IED Report, Spring/Summer 2024

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Cross-cutting C-IED elements

Preventative C-IED elements

Responsive C-IED elements