Managing a C-IED Enterprise

By Paul Amoroso, an explosive hazards specialist at Assessed Mitigation Options (AMO) consultancy

INTRODUCTION

As part of a series of papers published on the investment in a C-IED enterprise1 to counter an IED system,2 this paper will examine the structures and approaches which can support the effective and efficient management of a C-IED enterprise. A previous paper published in the Counter-IED Report3 provided a framework for the design of a C-IED enterprise which includes a process commencing with a baseline assessment, followed by the development of a strategic plan and finally its operationalisation.

Once operationalized, the C-IED enterprise needs to be managed to ensure it remains:

  1. Threat aligned – the threat being confronted will evolve over time in terms of the technical sophistication and tactical employment of IEDs as the IED network4 employing them will seek to circumvent the C-IED efforts5 invested against them;
  2. Effective in responding to and ultimately preventing IED use;
  3. Efficient in terms of the return on investment from the resources committed in the enterprise to avoid duplication of effort, inefficiencies and seek optimal investment of the limited available resources.

To ensure the C-IED enterprise remains aligned with current threats, effective, and efficient, it is essential to continually monitor and evaluate the impact of C-IED efforts. This requires modifying these efforts as needed. Therefore, an ongoing process of monitoring, evaluating, and learning (MEL) must be embedded within the C-IED enterprise. Such a MEL process needs to be timely in its responsiveness to adapt and maintain the C-IED enterprise’s threat alignment, effectiveness and efficiency.

In addition to the three management requirements of a C-IED enterprise, there is also the need to factor in realistic and often shifting timelines. Additional management challenges arise when a C-IED enterprise is operating in an active conflict zone, in some cases under mandates that can be complex and sometimes contradictory.6 These requirements and issues faced in managing a C-IED enterprise collectively present a challenge to typical linear, rigid management practices, necessitating the need for flexibility, or more accurately, agility within a C-IED enterprise.

As a result, the management of a C-IED enterprise requires the timely coordination and synchronisation of all C-IED efforts invested in, through a structure that supports unity of effort, along with agile management practices7 to ensure the effective and efficient utility of the resources invested. Such efforts when collectively applied are intended to reduce the impact that actual or threatened IED use, are having in terms of victims (killed, maimed, and injured) and their psychological effect in terms of intimidation of free politics, economic activity, development, and social freedoms. The overarching strategic goal of a C-IED enterprise should be to effectively and efficiently respond to and ultimately prevent IED use. The gold standard C-IED enterprise is one that involves a comprehensive whole-of-society approach8 based on a unity of effort by all of its stakeholders. When unity of effort within a C-IED enterprise is achieved along with the appropriate management of the resources invested into the enterprise, it is best positioned to effectively and efficiently respond to and ultimately prevent IED use. Unity of effort and resource management are not separate endeavors; they are interconnected and mutually reinforcing. Specifically, as unity of effort improves within an enterprise the resources invested in will be more impactful making their management easier and vice versa, as the management of resources invested in a C-IED enterprise improves, unity of effort will be easier to achieve. The opposite is also true, challenges in achieving unity of effort will make the effective and efficient management of resources difficult, while poorly managed resources will make unity of effort difficult to achieve.

This paper outlines how the overall management of a whole-of-society C-IED enterprise involving synchronisation and unity of effort, along with the effective and efficient management of the resources invested in, through a coordinating committee can support the overarching strategic goal of effectively and efficiently responding to and ultimately preventing IED use. The requirement for a C-IED enterprise to be agile, through an embedded MEL process with associated timely adaptation, is the topic of another paper published in the Counter-IED Report entitled, Agile C-IED Enterprises.

C-IED ENTERPRISE COORDINATING COMMITTEE

The designated lead entity9 with ultimate responsibility for a C-IED enterprise may form a coordinating committee to oversee its management. A C-IED enterprise coordinating committee is a group responsible for aligning and synchronizing the C-IED efforts invested in, in pursuit of the overarching strategic goal. A coordinating committee ensures all C-IED efforts are harmonized in support of unity of effort as well as the effective and efficient utility of the resources invested. A C-IED coordinating committee can achieve this through:

  1. Facilitating communication and information sharing, by ensuring timely and effective communication and collaboration among different stakeholders;10
  2. Monitoring, evaluation and learning, to ensure the enterprise remains threat aligned as well as supporting oversight of the C-IED efforts invested in by tracking their progress to ensure they are on track or not;
  3. Providing strategic direction to the C-IED enterprise, firstly through the coordination and synchronization of all C-IED efforts invested in, to ensure complementarity and secondly by working to ensure unity of effort is achieved across the constituent C-IED efforts so that the enterprise remains aligned with the overarching strategic goal;
  4. Adapting the C-IED enterprise as required to ensure firstly it remains threat aligned, secondly the C-IED efforts invested in are optimised to support the overarching strategic goal of the enterprise and thirdly, to work efficiently and effectively within the resources provided to the enterprise.
SYNCHRONISATION AND UNITY OF EFFORT

Thus far, the management of a C-IED enterprise has emphasised the need for synchronisation and unity of effort. These are two different, but closely related concepts in the management of a C-IED enterprise. Synchronisation focuses on precise timing and coordination of C-IED activities, while unity of effort, focuses on harmonizing the constituent C-IED efforts invested in, ensuring they remain aligned with the overarching strategic goal of responding to and ultimately preventing the use of IEDs.

Synchronisation

Synchronization refers to the precise coordination of C-IED activities and resources to ensure they occur at the right time and place to achieve maximum effectiveness. It involves aligning C-IED activities and their timing to create complementarity and efficiency between the various C-IED efforts that make up an enterprise. Synchronisation within a C-IED enterprise can take place in many ways and on many levels.

The need for a strategic plan, to counter the use of IEDs, to have simultaneous and synchronized C-IED efforts at the tactical / technical, operational and strategic / policy levels has been outlined previously.11 Synchronization in this case refers to structures and protocols established and implemented between the various C-IED efforts which make up a C-IED enterprise to ensure overall optimized effectiveness and efficiency in responding to and ultimately preventing the use of IEDs. It involves coordinating various C-IED elements to ensure they work together seamlessly, enhancing overall likelihood of achieving the overarching strategic goal. Synchronized C-IED efforts, are often undertaken in parallel or simultaneously so that they are mutually reinforcing and beneficial to the C-IED enterprise. The US Army’s C-IED strategy states, within its governance line of effort, the need for “the army C-IED enterprises [to be] appropriately resourced and synchronized.”12

On a tactical level, investment in appropriate and sustainable search and detect capabilities needs to be synchronised with the required supporting EOD capabilities. The development and deployment of both must be synchronized at the required scale and geographic distribution to achieve an effective “defeat the device”13 C-IED element within the enterprise. Similar synchronization is required for the development, sustainment and capacity expansion of electronic countermeasures (ECM) capabilities,14 route clearance package (RCP) capabilities15 and weapons technical intelligence16 (WTI) capabilities. Another example would be the qualification of IEDD operators to high threat17 level with the synchronization of the delivery into service of the associated technology, equipment and complete life support logistics to sustain such a capability. Higher-level IEDD capabilities also require advanced on- scene IED exploitation skills. This may involve deploying suitable exploitation experts to high-threat or significant incident scenes or alternatively have high-threat operators qualified to recover evidence and exploit the scene. This latter approach will require protocols to safely place recovered items into the evidence chain in a forensically sound manner. As a State’s IED on-scene exploitation and evidence recovery capabilities improve, there may be a need to increase off-scene exploitation capabilities, which will also need to be synchronized.

The temptation to pursue neat and clean synchronisation across C-IED efforts should be avoided, especially that which is rigid and inflexible. There is often a need to simultaneously invest in various C-IED efforts, each with different priorities. Over time, these initial prioritization requirements will change, necessitating adaptation and further synchronization. Thus flexibility is required as the rate at which various C-IED efforts mature to being impactful can vary, the threat can evolve, and the wider security environment can change.

Unity of effort

Unity of effort,18 in comparison to synchronization, is a broader concept that emphasizes the importance of different entities working together toward the overarching strategic goal of effectively and efficiently addressing and ultimately preventing IED use. It ensures all entities within a C-IED enterprise work in concert, even if they are not directly synchronized in their actions. Unity of effort within a C-IED enterprise prevents the constituent entities from working at cross purposes and reduces wasteful duplication of effort to ultimately optimise the investment of resources. It can be achieved through investment in C-IED efforts that are mutually supporting and reinforcing. Each of the C-IED efforts invested in, needs to share overlapping subordinate objectives that support the overall goal19 to effectively and efficiently respond to and ultimately prevent IED use. This requires a C-IED community comprised of engaged and empowered stakeholders who are properly resourced, operating within an appropriately managed enterprise that seeks to optimize resources being invested. In security or military centric C-IED enterprises, unity of effort is similar to unity of command, except unlike unity of command, unity of effort requires coordination between entities not in the same command structure, as is the case with interagency operations.20 In particular, a whole-of- society approach to C-IED requires unity of effort rather than unity of command as it involves an enterprise that includes a broad array of stakeholders21 that will not come under one ‘command’ as can be the case with security or defence entities. This lack of a command structure associated with a C-IED enterprise makes the legal empowerment of the enterprise essential to increase the likelihood of its success.22 Unity of effort can be achieved through a campaign plan,23 with a previous Counter-IED Report24 paper outlining the use of a strategic plan to achieve this.

MANAGEMENT APPROACHES TO A C-IED ENTERPRISE

A well-managed structure must be designed and implemented for any C-IED enterprise. The purpose of the management structure and tools employed is to ensure the effective and efficient use of resources in the C-IED efforts to achieve the desired impacts against the IED system in support of the overarching strategy. In determining the most appropriate structure(s) and tools to be employed in the management of a C-IED enterprise, application of the KISS principle of ‘keeping it simple (as possible) and structured’ at all times should be central.

C-IED enterprise management structures may be established that consist of a number of projects aligned to various C-IED efforts invested in. Alternatively, a number of C-IED projects can be collectively managed under a program. The possibility of programs coming under a given portfolio management structure and even several portfolios making up a C-IED enterprise is also a possibility. However, having an overly complex or bureaucratically cumbersome management structure for a C-IED enterprise is to be guarded against.

Whatever management structure is used, various management tools can be employed. When considering which management tool(s) to engage, one needs to determine what metrics will be used to monitor and evaluate the various C-IED efforts invested in. It can be challenging to identify the most appropriate metrics to employ for a number of reasons. Firstly, it can be difficult to quantify what success entails and the associated metrics used to measure the impact of any particular C-IED effort invested in. The assessments employed can often be subjective rather than scientific. Secondly, the investment in a given C-IED effort can take time to show impact on countering the use of IEDs. The timelines required to show effects can in some cases go beyond the management and funding cycles of the funding source. This often requires initial investment in what can be considered quick impact projects which can show impact attached to metrics of performance. Such quick impact projects may involve an initial focus on investing in cross-cutting or responsive C-IED efforts. However, very often when investing in preventative C-IED efforts, it can be challenging to secure buy-in, owing to poor short and often medium-term return on investment. It is important that decision makers especially those backing the enterprise politically as well as those funding it financially see preventative C-IED efforts as longer-term investments with the potential for greater impact compared to responsive C-IED efforts. Overall, in trying to effectively and efficiently manage any C-IED effort, simple (as possible) metrics need to be monitored and evaluated. Metrics of individual C-IED efforts should ideally feed into broader overall indicators of C-IED enterprise progress.

One such approach could be the application of a theory of change framework;25 however, one needs to consider what theory of change will be employed, what the expected success will look like and what the (imposed) project timelines are. A results-based management approach can be adapted to manage a C-IED enterprise. This is a broad management strategy aimed at achieving improved performance and demonstrable results, which includes elements of design, monitoring and evaluation and contributes to learning, risk management and accountability.26

Individual projects within a C-IED enterprise can use the PRINCE2 methodology. PRINCE2 is an acronym standing for PRojects IN Controlled Environments, which refers to a structured project management method and practitioner certification programme. It is a process-based method for effective project management, emphasizing dividing projects into manageable and controllable stages. PRINCE2 is widely recognised and practised internationally and is in use in the mine action community. However, the often- dynamic nature of a C-IED enterprise owing to the challenges of countering an IED threat can make the rigid use of such project management tools less than optimal to allow for the agility needed within C-IED enterprise management. In this case, the contexts in which C-IED enterprises are needed, are often less than ‘Controlled Environments’.

CONCLUSION

The management of a whole-of-society C-IED enterprise to remain threat aligned, effective and efficient in pursuit of the overarching strategic goal of responding to and ultimately preventing IED use is challenging. This requires the timely coordination and synchronisation of all C-IED efforts invested in, through a structure that supports unity of effort, along with agile management practices to ensure the effective and efficient utility of the resources invested. A coordinating committee can work to ensure that all C-IED efforts are harmonized in support of unity of effort as well as the effective and efficient utility of the resources invested.

A C-IED coordinating committee can achieve this through facilitating communication and information sharing within the enterprise, supporting oversight through monitoring evaluating and learning by tracking the C-IED efforts invested in, providing strategic direction and adapting the C-IED enterprise as required. The requirement of agility, through an embedded MEL process with associated timely adaptation are equally important aspects of achieving threat aligned, effective and efficient management of a C-IED enterprise. This is the topic of another paper published in the Counter-IED Report entitled, Agile C-IED Enterprises. ■

FOOTNOTES

  1. A C-IED enterprise refers to the collective efforts aimed at countering IED threats. It can involve anything which is intended to predict, discover or detect, prevent, protect against, respond to or neutralise, recover from or exploit, mitigate against, or deter IED attacks.
  2. The combination of people, processes, and material that go into supporting, funding, procuring, manufacturing, transporting, targeting, preparing, emplacing, executing, and publicising any element of an IED attack, including the indoctrination, training, and life support of the persons involved.
  3. A Conceptual Framework for C-IED Enterprise Design, The Counter-IED Report, Autumn 2024 edition.
  4. The term refers to all individuals or entities involved in supporting IED attacks. This includes direct roles such as supply, transport, manufacture, planning, emplacement, and execution, as well as indirect roles like financing and publicizing. It serves as a generic term encompassing various groups often contextually referred to as terrorists, criminals, insurgents,non-state armed groups, bandits, self-protection groups, and others.
  5. C-IED efforts may be responsive, preventative or cross-cutting in nature. Such efforts include, inter alia, legal instruments, training, mentoring, advice, operational and tactical or technical assistance, technology and equipment provision, intelligence activities, investigations and actions against an IED system, interagency and international cooperation, control of explosives and other IED components as well as any other investment made to respond to and ultimately prevent IED use.
  6. Identifying Counter Improvised Explosive Device Strategic Principles for East Africa, Paul Amoroso, MA Strategic Studies Thesis, National University of Ireland, Cork, School of History, September 2022.
  7.  The requirement for a C-IED enterprise to be agile, is the topic of another paper published in the Counter-IED Report entitled, Agile C-IED Enterprises.
  8. A whole-of-society approach to C-IED is a comprehensive approach to C-IED involving a broad array of stakeholders contributing to a C-IED enterprise. It can include multiple elements of state security, defence, government departments, ministries, offices, and agencies along with civil society organisations, commercial and industry entities as well as international and regional organizations. Whole-of-society C-IED approaches often have stakeholders with complex institutional structures and procedures requiring internal coherence, a cooperative and collaborative culture between members to support effective C-IED efforts through a shared understanding of the IED threat faced. Source: Adapted from Phases of a C-IED Enterprise, Counter-IED Report Autumn 2024, by Paul Amoroso.
  9. For more information on a designated lead entity within a C-IED enterprise see, Necessity of a Designated Lead Entity within National C-IED Enterprises, The Counter-IED Report, Spring / Summer 2024 edition.
  10. The importance of communication within a C-IED enterprise when designing one has been outlined in a previous article, A Conceptual Framework for C-IED Enterprise Design, The Counter-IED Report, Autumn 2024 edition.
  11. For a C-IED enterprise to be successful, a strategic approach, which employs effective and efficient operational processes in support of optimal tactical and technical capabilities and capacities is required. This can be considered alignment of the C-IED enterprise from the policy / strategic level through the operational level to the tactical / technical level. For such alignment to occur, a strategic plan, based on the assessed IED threat, is required to inform what the goal of the enterprise is. Such a strategic plan needs to include the concepts, which in this case refer to the C-IED efforts, that will be invested in to optimise the likelihood of achieving the goal. The C-IED efforts invested in will inform the enterprise’s structure. Finally, the resources needed to develop and ultimately sustain these efforts need to be identified and secured. Source: A Conceptual Framework for C-IED Enterprise Design, The Counter-IED Report, Autumn 2024 edition.
  12. US DoD. 2022. “Army C-IED Strategy.” Washington DC: US DoD, February, Page 11.
  13. Defeat the device refers to a defensive line of operation involving a suite of responsive C-IED efforts which include all actionsand activities designed to reduce the number of or the effect of IED initiations. Defeat the device activities intend to mitigate the effects of, detect or dispose of IEDs. Within many military models of C-IED, defeat the device is considered as one of three lines of operation along with attack the network and prepare the force. Many C-IED efforts can be considered defeat the device activities, including, mobility planning advice; and force protection advice; search activities; Route Clearance Package (RCP) capabilities; Conventional Munitions Disposal (CMD) activities; Electronic Countermeasure (ECM) assets; and Improvised Device Disposal (IEDD) activities. In some cases, Weapons Technical Intelligence (WTI), host nation support and local population engagement can also be considered as defeat the device activities. However, a previous paper published in the Counter-IED Report,A sets out 15 elements that can make up a C-IED enterprise with defeat the device considered one such element. Within these 15 elements, WTI comes under exploitation, host nation support comes under interagency and international cooperation and local population engagement comes under both understanding and the preparation elements. Note A: Building the C-IED enterprise to counter the IED system, The Counter-IED Report, Winter 2023 / 2024 edition, p. 19.
  14. Also referred to as Counter RCIED Warfare (CREW) capabilities.
  15. Route clearance packages refer to the combination of force protection assets, search and EOD capabilities which are threataligned and within available resources to clear explosive threats from a defined route to an agreed standard. They consist of specially trained and equipped teams with equipment designed to aid in identifying and disposing of IEDs and explosives hazards along routes of travel. They are typically employed in non-permissive areas where IEDs are being used to impede mobility and disrupt governance in the area.
  16. Intelligence derived from the processes and capabilities that collect, exploit and analyse asymmetric threat weapons systems to enable material sourcing, support to prosecution, force protection, signature characterisation and targeting of threat networks. Source: UN IED Threat Mitigation Handbook, Second Edition 2024, Annex A- Lexicon.
  17. A high-threat IEDD operator is an individual with specialized training and expertise who works to address the threat posed by IEDs often needing to locate, identify, render safe and or dispose of IEDs while maintaining security in challenging semi- or non-permissive environments.
  18. The sate of harmonizing efforts among multiple entities working towards a common goal.
  19. The goal of a C-IED enterprise is a broad, long-term outcome that it aims to achieve, providing overall direction and vision.The author has advocated that the goal of a C-IED enterprise needs to be the ability to effectively and efficiently respond to and ultimately prevent IED use. Related to the goal of a C-IED enterprise are the subordinate objectives for each of the C-IED efforts invested in. These objectives need to be SMARTA and contribute to the overall strategic goal, breaking down this goal into more manageable parts. Subordinate objectives make it easier to track progress and ensure that the goal is met. Note A: Criteria that are Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant and Time-Bound. SMART criteria are often used to determine whether an indicator is strong and useful for monitoring purposes. Source: SSR in a Nutshell, Manual for Introductory Training on SSR, DCAF/ ISSAT 2012
  20. The Author has previously proposed 15 key elements to a C-IED enterprise, one of which is interagency and international cooperation. Building the C-IED enterprise to counter the IED system, The Counter-IED Report, Winter 2023 / 2024 edition.
  21. These include, multiple elements of state security, defence, government departments, ministries, offices, and agencies alongwith civil society organisations, commercial and industry entities as well as international and regional organizations.
  22. Legally empowered C-IED enterprises, The Counter-IED Report, Winter 2023 / 2024 edition.
  23. Campaign plans are synonymous with military planning; however, they are also used elsewhere such as business marketingplanning and political campaigning.
  24. A Conceptual Framework for C-IED Enterprise Design, The Counter-IED Report, Autumn 2024 edition.
  25. A theory of change is a comprehensive description of how and why a desired change is expected to happen in a particular context. It does this by first identifying the desired long-term goals and then works back from these to identify all the conditions (outcomes) that must be in place, and how these relate to one another causally, for the goals to occur.
  26. Source: SSR in a Nutshell, Manual for Introductory Training on SSR, DCAF/ ISSAT 2012

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Paul Amoroso is an explosive hazards specialist and has extensive experience as an IED Threat Mitigation Policy Advisor working in East and West Africa. He served in the Irish Army as an IED Disposal and CBRNe officer, up to MNT level, and has extensive tactical, operational, and strategic experience in Peacekeeping Operations in Africa and the Middle East. He has experience in the development of doctrine and policy and was one of the key contributors to the United Nations Improvised Explosive Device Disposal Standards and the United Nations Explosive Ordnance Disposal Military Unit Manual. He works at present in the MENA region on SALW control as well as in wider Africa advising on national and regional C- IED strategies. He has a MSc in Explosive Ordnance Engineering and an MA in Strategic Studies. He runs a consultancy, Assessed Mitigation Options (AMO), which provides advice, support, and training delivery in EOD, C-IED, WAM as well as Personal Security Awareness Training (PSAT) and Hostile Environment Awareness Training (HEAT). This article reflects his own views and not necessarily those of any organisation he has worked for or with in developing these ideas.
LinkedIn profile: https://www.linkedin.com/in/paul-amoroso-msc-ma-miexpe-60a63a42/

Download PDF: 15-21 Paul Amoroso – Managing a C-IED Enterprise – COUNTER-IED REPORT, Winter 2024-25

Counter-IED Report Winter 2024/25