By Paul Amoroso, an explosive hazards specialist at Assessed Mitigation Options (AMO) consultancy
Introduction
Fragile, fragmented, or failed regions, states or localities are vulnerable to IED use, with their impact most acute in terms of their political, economic and social destabilising impacts. As such, the IED is likely to be a prevalent and enduring threat within such security landscapes for the foreseeable future. The author has in the Spring-Summer, Autumn and Winter 2023 editions of The Counter IED Report published a series of articles related to national and regional Counter IED (C-IED) efforts.1 As part of this series of articles the author has discussed amongst other issues, the need to build a C-IED enterprise2 and empower it legally to counter the IED system.3 In one article,4 entitled ‘C-IED Strategic Principles5 for East Africa’ 6 one of ten principles identified, was the need to name a legally empowered national C-IED lead entity. This article intends to examine the need and potential options for such a legally empowered national C-IED lead entity.
Members of a National C-IED Enterprise
As part of a whole of society approach to C-IED, a comprehensive C-IED stakeholder community, appropriately resourced and effectively managed, needs to be established and sustained. The exact members who will make up a national C-IED enterprise, will vary according to factors such as:
- IED threat being countered and ideally whenever possible, potential emerging IED threats;
- Legal framework under which the enterprise is to operate;
- Elements that will make up the national C-IED enterprise i.e. which C-IED efforts to be invested in;
- Resources made available to operate the enterprise;
- State security and government structures needed to be part of the enterprise;
- Regional and international C-IED initiatives the enterprise is to be coordinated with;
- Civil society organisations and industry representative organisations who can contribute to various elements of the enterprise.
In a previous article within The Counter IED Report,7 potential members within a national C-IED stakeholder community were examined, which identified the following groups who may be members of a national C-IED enterprise:
- Internal stakeholders within the state;
- External stakeholders supporting the state;
- Security and defence entities;
- Members from across government departments, ministries, offices, and agencies;
- Civil society organisations;
- Commercial and industry entities, including representative associations;
- Regional organisations and international community organisations.
Why a Lead Entity Within a National C-IED Enterprise is Needed
Several factors influence the desired end state of a national C-IED enterprise. Firstly, the legal framework under which it is to function will influence the ways the enterprise will operate. Secondly, the resources available to invest in the C-IED enterprise will determine the means of the enterprise. There will often be multiple ways or options available in terms of how the desired end state may be achieved. Added to this, will be different recommendations from the members of the C-IED enterprise on which options to choose. In certain cases, some C-IED stakeholders may strongly advocate certain options over others based on their paradigm of what a national approach to C-IED should be. Regardless of the myriad of potential ways that may be available to achieve the desired end state of a national C-IED enterprise, there is inevitably always limited resources available in terms of finances, time, and expertise to invest. The prioritization of investment of these limited resources will also be influenced by the legal framework under which the national C-IED enterprise is being undertaken. Resource investment will also need to be considered over the medium to long term as the various efforts invested in will need to be not only maintained but modified as the IED threat evolves and the C-IED enterprise needs to be adapted, so that its stays threat aligned and continues to invest in the most appropriate ways under the legal framework it is required to operate. For these and other reasons, significant tension, and sometimes unhealthy competition between the members of a national C-IED enterprise can arise when deciding the ways a C-IED enterprise should invest in, along with the allocation of limited resources. Due to these issues of lack of coordination and possible cooperation within a national C-IED enterprise, which in some cases can lead to detrimental competition between stakeholders, all enterprise members involved need to be coordinated by a central entity.
The political leadership, who are backing the establishment of a national C-IED enterprise need to demonstrate acknowledgement of the problem posed by the use and threatened use of IEDs along with a commitment to addressing their use by designating a focal point authority with overall responsibility for a national C-IED enterprise. Such a lead entity will require government level agreement on their role, responsibilities, resources and limitations, to empower them sufficiently to ensure coordination and cooperation between the other members of the enterprise so that a coherent national approach to C-IED is achieved. The choice of a designated national lead entity needs to be communicated to all internal national C-IED enterprise members as well as to international stakeholders and partners.
What is a National C-IED Enterprise Lead entity?
The term national C-IED enterprise lead entity is used as a generic one to designate any office, institution, ministry, department, board, body, or other establishment which has responsibilities to the national C-IED enterprise it is charged to lead. In particular it should have responsibility for:
- Ensuring the success of the national C-IED enterprise in line with a national strategy so that a coherent national approach to C-IED is achieved to ultimately match but ideally overmatch the use or threatened use of IEDs.
- Exercise governance over the enterprise to ensure all its members are operating under the legal framework that empowers them in their role, duties and responsibilities.
- Provide coordination, advocacy, strategic level awareness and integration necessary to ensure coherence, collaboration, and complementarity between the various C-IED enterprise members.8 Allocate and prioritize resource investment in the various C-IED efforts which make up all initiatives, activities, assistance, capabilities, and capacities of the C-IED enterprise. For example, the US Army C-IED strategy states the “entity designated as the lead to coordinate national C-IED efforts will be responsible to ensure the C-IED efforts invested in are appropriately integrated in a coordinated manner between the national C-IED lines of effort that are engaged in.” 9
- Foster, encourage and facilitate a collaborative timely information sharing culture10 amongst all the C-IED enterprise members.
- Monitor the individual and overall effectiveness of the various C-IED efforts invested in, to appropriately adapt the C-IED enterprise as the inevitable change in the IED threat, it is countering, occurs, as the IED system responds to the C-IED efforts introduced against it. Adaptation of the C-IED enterprise may also be necessary due to changes in the legal framework under which it is required to operate.
Ideally such a lead entity would also coordinate all national C-IED efforts with any C-IED donor assistance11 being provided and determine where it is best invested to have optimal impact. In an article in the Winter 2023/2024 edition of this publication by Colonel H R Naidu Gade, another perspective on what a national C-IED enterprise lead entity may be responsible for is presented. In this article on national counter IED strategy for India, the need to designate what is called a nodal agency is outlined. The role of such a nodal agency is “to coordinate and track progress across all the agencies at national, state, and local levels toward building the C-IED capabilities. It should facilitate harnessing the innovative potential of the research and development organizations to meet a dynamic, complex, and adaptive threat and to promote an informed and agile research and acquisitions process that stays ahead of the threat and develops timely and effective C-IED systems and solutions.”12
Overall, a national C-IED enterprise lead entity should act as the national coordinating mechanism that is responsible for the direction and coordination of all members of the national C-IED enterprise that it leads.
National Competent Authority
A term that is often used internationally, when it comes to arms control and related activities is national authority, with the Modular Small Arms Control Implementation Compendium (MOSAIC),13 the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG)14 and the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS),15 all referring to the need for and roles of a ‘national authority.’ While there are slight differences between the three publications and what they consider a national authority to be, to reflect the nuances of the respective requirements, a national authority can broadly be taken as the lead government agency, department(s), organisation(s) or institution(s) which can provide political coordination and policy direction and is charged with the regulation, management, co-ordination and operation of the national effort they are responsible for. Another term that is often used to lead and coordinate the regulation of a specific national endeavour or area of public interest, is a national competent authority. They are an official body or organisation with regulatory oversight and governance of the initiatives, activities, assistance, capabilities, and capacities they have responsibility for, working closely with relevant stakeholders, to support the effectiveness of their area of responsibility. They often play a lead role in policy development, licensing, inspection, enforcement, and public education and can act as the national focal point for international cooperation and collaboration with national and international entities to ensure harmonisation of policies, practice and standards. As such when considering who may act as a national C-IED enterprise lead, the concepts associated with a national competent authority are worthy of consideration.
Potential National C-IED Enterprise Lead Entities
It is important to remember no one-size-fits-all and the best fit to lead any national C-IED enterprise will involve consideration of the context, threat and any limitations imposed. A previous article has outlined four potential legal frameworks under which a national C-IED enterprise may be undertaken. These include, a criminal justice model, a counter terrorism, a counter insurgency and a war model approach. Each of these approaches to C-IED is likely to have a different lead entity. For example, a criminal justice model approach may have a police or justice system lead. A counter terrorism approach may have a police, justice, internal security or security services lead depending on the state’s internal security architecture. A counter insurgency approach to C-IED may have a paramilitary or military lead as would a war model approach. Several options exist when deciding the entity to lead a national C-IED enterprise. Options include establishing a new office, organization, or department; a police or justice system lead; a military led enterprise; or an arms control office which could engage an existing mine action authority or alternatively engage a small arms and light weapons national commission. We will examine five potential national C-IED enterprise lead entities.
New Office, Organization, or Department
Establishing a new entity can involve challenges such as straining already limited budgets and the risk of duplication of positions between it and pre-existing entities which may have certain crossover capabilities or areas of responsibility. It is also likely that it will take a certain amount of time to setup, recruit or second personnel into and establish processes and procedures to support a system of work practices between the various members of the C-IED enterprise.
Police or Justice System Lead
A police led C-IED enterprise, may have the lead entity based within the ministry of justice, interior or similar with this varying between countries. In certain ways a justice led C-IED entity has advantages over a military led one as law enforcement are likely to be more appropriately skilled and experienced to undertake the various efforts needed to exploit IED incidents, prosecute IED systems and work toward the judicial prosecution of IED network members. Another advantage of a justice lead entity is that police typically have less classification and handling restriction issues for IED intelligence compared to the military which will support information sharing.
Military Led Enterprise
During research conducted by the author on this topic,16 one key informant, explained how in the West Africa region, experience has shown that there are those who consider national C-IED initiatives as a national security or stability matter, making it a defence or counter terrorism issue. This shows how there may be circumstances when a military led enterprise is the best option, such as when national C-IED is undertaken under a counter terrorism, counter insurgency, or war model legal framework. A military led C-IED enterprise could involve a national military or a paramilitary entity within the state security apparatus. A military led enterprise would be a security centric one and was the typical approach taken with the emergence of contemporary C-IED emanating from Iraq and Afghanistan, which involved three main pillars or lines of effort of defeat the device, attack the network, train the force, with understanding and intelligence underpinning and providing crossover between them. However, with a military led enterprise coordinating various preventative C-IED efforts, beyond intelligence led operations, may be a challenge. For example, the development, sustainment and adaptation of national policy, regulations, and legislation, the control and security of explosives, IED precursor controls and border controls, could be a challenge for a military or paramilitary lead.
Engaging an Existing National Mine Action Authority
The inclusion of certain types of victim operated IEDs, which may be considered improvised landmines, under the 1996 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), allows this international convention to be leveraged to assist in aspects of C-IED. Similarly, UN CCW APII17 also considers some types of IEDs to fall within the definitions of ‘boobytraps’ and ‘mines’ under the convention.18 These allow C-IED a point of entry, for it to be built into existing international efforts, fora and arms control architectures. With such an approach to C-IED, existing national mine action authorities may be engaged to act as the lead entity for a national C-IED enterprise. National mine action authorities can have certain transferrable skills and capabilities which can be retrained for C-IED purposes along with existing access to key government entities and certain international organisations as well as international NGOs who may be able to support with C-IED donor assistance. For example, the UN, humanitarian mine action organisations as well as certain NGOs may assist in the transformation of national mine action authorities to becoming C-IED capable. Such aspects are advantageous in terms of the potential for having pre-existing competencies, expertise and capacities that can be adapted with relative ease to allow the development of a competent national C-IED enterprise lead with relative ease. However, despite certain overlaps, C-IED and mine action are different, and new expertise, skillsets and competencies may need to be brought into an existing national mine action authority, while at the same time ensuring specific mine action competencies and expertise are maintained. Another consideration is that existing mine action authorities may be too humanitarian focused for them to be effective in leading the development, sustainment and inevitable adaptation of a national C-IED enterprise. The suitability of an existing mine action authority to be adapted to lead a national C-IED enterprise may be influenced by the legal framework under which the national C-IED enterprise is being undertaken. NGOs involved in mine action within an IED affected State may be relatively cooperative in engaging in some aspects of C-IED provided it is in a post conflict or at least not active conflict setting; however, there may be NGOs working in humanitarian mine action who may not be cooperative with security or military force members of a national C-IED enterprise as they consider such cooperation may compromise their impartiality. Such a lack of cooperation can be particularly problematic when it comes to IED exploitation and the associated information sharing which are critical for effective C-IED. Such an approach runs counter to the need for a whole of society approach to C-IED. These challenges and differences in approach to C-IED as well as cultural nuances between NGO or humanitarian mine actors and security force entities involved in C-IED need to be considered if an existing mine action authority is to be given the role of lead within a national C-IED enterprise.
Engaging a National Small Arms Light Weapons / Arms Commission or Similar
There are those who consider C-IED as an arms control issue, with the UN CCW APII examining the issue of IEDs on an annual basis through the Annual Conferences of the High Contracting Parties and meeting of the Group of Experts.19 For this reason, C-IED may be considered to be dealt with, by national arms control institutions, such as small arms light weapon commissions or equivalent entities.20 For example, in the West Africa region, this issue of C- IED has emerged as an issue related to small arms and light weapons (SALW) control. West African regional arms control approaches have been through the Bamako Declaration21 and the 2006 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition, and Other Related Material. This convention states that ‘other related materials’ include ‘… any chemical substance serving as active material used as a propelling or explosive agent.’ 22 The ECOWAS Commission has taken the position that IEDs fall under the remit of the ECOWAS Convention under ‘other related materials’ and encouraged member states to work through this convention to mitigate the risks of IEDs. In practice, the national small arms commissions of several ECOWAS member states approach C-IED by acting as a focal point for small arms, mine action, and IEDs, in the absence of a dedicated body designated to coordinate on this multifaceted issue.23
Conclusion
As has been outlined in this article, no one-size-fits- all when assessing who is best to act as the lead entity for a national C-IED enterprise. In reality, the choice will require consideration of many factors with the membership of the national enterprise itself a key influence along with the legal framework under which the enterprise will operate. One of the key roles of a national C-IED lead entity is to ensure coherence, coordination and complementarity between its members and minimize unnecessary and unproductive interagency competition for limited resources while at the same time ensuring a collaborative culture of timely information sharing to maintain optimized understanding. This can be challenging to achieve amongst what can be a diverse community of stakeholders who make up the enterprise and may have to operate in a challenging and pressurized environment in which IED use can be an ongoing destabilizing security issue. As such, to use the description by Colonel H R Naidu Gade of the challenges of national C-IED strategy, a national C-IED enterprise lead entity needs great patience, persuasion and political statesmanship.24 ■
Footnotes:
- C-IED efforts refer to all initiatives, activities, assistance, capabilities and capacities that collectively make up a C-IED enterprise. C-IED efforts can include, inter alia, training, mentoring, advising, accompanying, assisting, technology and equipment provision and intelligence support.
- A C-IED enterprise is the collective term to describe all initiatives, activities, assistance, capabilities and capacities that contribute to the C-IED efforts intended to at least match but ideally overmatch the threat posed by the use or threatened use of IEDs. It can involve anything which is intended to predict discover or detect, prevent, protect against, respond to or neutralise, recover from or exploit, mitigate against, or deter IED attacks.
- An IED system is the combination of people, processes and material that go into supporting, funding, procuring, manufacturing, transporting, targeting, preparing, emplacing, executing and publicising any element of an IED attack, including the indoctrination, training and life support of the persons involved.
- The Counter IED Report, Autumn 2023, pp. 15 – 21, ISSN 2050-6732 (Print) ISSN 2050-6740 (Online)
- C-IED strategic principles refer to fundamental rules and guidelines that serve as a foundation for reasoning and decision making about the longer-term direction in a C-IED enterprise. They can help states and regional organisations to at least match but ideally over match the threat posed by IEDs within a given region.
- This research focused on defining strategic C-IED principles for East Africa for two reasons. Firstly, the enduring IED threat in East Africa with the likelihood of an increase in their use and secondly the potential for over-extension by looking at too broad or many regions.
- The Counter IED Report, Winter 2023/24, pp. 15 – 22, ISSN 2050-6732 (Print) ISSN 2050-6740 (Online)
- Adapted from, US DoD. 2022. “Army C-IED Strategy.” Washington DC: US DoD, February, pp.11.
- US DoD. 2022. “Army C-IED Strategy.” Washington DC: US DoD, February, pp.18.
- This issue of the criticality of timely information between the members of national C-IED enterprise and the associated challenges in making this happen have previously been discussed in an article in The Counter IED Report, Autumn 2023, entitled ‘Understanding and Maximizing C-IED Information Sharing’.
- C-IED donor assistance refers to C-IED support provided on a bilateral basis, on a joint initiative from two or more States or by an international organisation, e.g., EU, League of Arab States, ECOWAS etc or an alliance e.g. NATO, to an IED affected state or region.
- India – The National Counter-IED Strategy, The Counter IED Report, Winter 2023/ 2024, by Colonel H R Naidu Gade (Retd), pp. 40.
- Source: Modular Small Arms Control Implementation Compendium MOSAIC 01.20 Glossary of terms, definitions and abbreviations Version 1.5 2018-04-30.
- Source: IATG 01.40 Third edition March 2021 Glossary of terms, definitions and abbreviations.
- Source: IMAS 04.10 Second Edition (Amendment 11, January 2023) Glossary of Mine Action Terms, definitions and Abbreviations.
- The content of this article is informed from on-going work in this area and research conducted by the author as part of a MA in strategic studies which examined and identified C-IED strategic principles for East Africa – Identifying Counter Improvised Explosive Device Strategic Principles for East Africa, Paul Amoroso, MA Strategic Studies Thesis, National University of Ireland, Cork, School of History, September 2022.
- Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Boobytraps, and Other Devices as Amended on 3 May 1996 (Protocol II, as Amended on 3 May 1996). Annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons, which May Be Deemed To Be Excessively Injurious or To Have Indiscriminate Effects.
- Out of Control – The Trafficking of Improvised Explosive Device Components and Commercial Explosives in West Africa, Small Arms Survey (Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies), Geneva, 2023 First published in November 2023, ISBN 978-2-940747-06-1. Pp. 90.
- Out of Control – The Trafficking of Improvised Explosive Device Components and Commercial Explosives in West Africa, Small Arms Survey (Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies), Geneva, 2023 First published in November 2023, ISBN 978-2-940747-06-1. Pp. 90.
- Some states have arms commissions, while others have small arms commissions with varying terms of reference and not all consider C-IED as an arms control issue that falls under their remit. We will use the term small and light weapon (SALW) commissions in this article as the collective term to refer to all such entities.
- Bamako Declaration on an African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons, 01 December 2000.
- ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition, and Other Related Material (2006), Article 1, para. 4.
- Source: Out of Control – The Trafficking of Improvised Explosive Device Components and Commercial Explosives in West Africa, Small Arms Survey (Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies), Geneva, 2023 First published in November 2023, ISBN 978-2-940747-06-1. Endnote 20.
- India – The National Counter-IED Strategy, The Counter IED Report, Winter 2023/ 2024, by Colonel H R Naidu Gade (Retd), pp. 40.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Paul Amoroso is an explosive hazards specialist and has extensive experience as an IED Threat Mitigation Policy Advisor working in East and West Africa. He served in the Irish Army as an IED Disposal and CBRNe officer, up to MNT level, and has extensive tactical, operational, and strategic experience in Peacekeeping Operations in Africa and the Middle East. He has experience in the development of doctrine and policy and was one of the key contributors to the United Nations Improvised Explosive Device Disposal Standards and the United Nations Explosive Ordnance Disposal Military Unit Manual. He works at present in the MENA region on SALW control as well as in wider Africa advising on national and regional C-IED strategies. He has a MSc in Explosive Ordnance Engineering and an MA in Strategic Studies. He runs a consultancy, Assessed Mitigation Options (AMO), which provides advice, support, and training delivery in EOD, C-IED, WAM as well as Personal Security Awareness Training (PSAT) and Hostile Environment Awareness Training (HEAT). This article reflects his own views and not necessarily those of any organisation he has worked for or with in developing these ideas.
Linkedin profile: https://www.linkedin.com/in/paul-amoroso-msc-ma-miexpe-60a63a42/
Counter-IED Report, Spring/Summer 2024
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