A Conceptual Framework for C-IED Enterprise Design

By Paul Amoroso, an explosive hazards specialist at Assessed Mitigation Options (AMO) consultancy

INTRODUCTION

In previous papers1 published in The Counter-IED Report, the author has advocated for the establishment of C-IED enterprises to counter IED systems2 with the intent to respond to and ultimately prevent IED employment. A C-IED enterprise refers to the collective efforts aimed at countering IED threats.3 It can involve anything which is intended to predict, discover or detect, prevent, protect against, respond to or neutralise, recover from or exploit, mitigate against, or deter IED attacks. At the heart of a C-IED enterprise are the C-IED efforts which are invested in, referring to all laws, strategies, policies, regulations, initiatives, activities, assistance, capabilities, and capacities that collectively make up a C-IED enterprise. C-IED efforts may be responsive, preventative or cross-cutting in nature. Such efforts include, inter alia, legal instruments, training, mentoring, advice, operational and tactical or technical assistance, technology and equipment provision, intelligence activities, investigations and actions against an IED system, interagency and international cooperation, control of explosives and other IED components as well as any other investment made to respond to and ultimately prevent IED use.

For a C-IED enterprise to be successful, a strategic policy approach, employing effective and efficient operational processes, for its constituent elements,4 to support optimal tactical and technical activities, is required. This can be viewed as the alignment of the C- IED enterprise from the policy / strategic level through the operational level to the tactical / technical level. For such alignment to occur, a strategic plan, based on the assessed IED threat, is required to inform what the goal of the enterprise is. Such a strategic plan needs to include the concepts, which in this case refer to the C-IED efforts invested in, intended to achieve the goal. The C-IED efforts invested in, will inform the enterprise’s structure. Finally, the resources needed to develop and ultimately sustain these efforts need to be identified and secured.

Once a strategic plan is developed, it needs to be operationalised. In this case, operationalisation is taken to refer to turning a strategic plan into actionable and measurable tactical and technical C-IED activities. This involves defining specific activities, allocating resources, and establishing operational processes and subordinate tactical and technical procedures to achieve the desired goal. Operationalisation involves making an abstract strategic plan into practical and executable activities. This paper sets out a contextually adaptive, conceptual, framework for the design of a C-IED enterprise involving:

A. Baseline assessment
B. Strategic plan development
C. Operationalisation

Figure 1: Concept of C-IED enterprise alignment from the strategic / policy, through the operational to the tactical / technical levels.

 

BASELINE ASSESSMENT

A baseline assessment is undertaken to determine and understand both the IED threat along with the maturity or lack thereof, of the key elements5 which contribute to a C-IED enterprise. Determining and understanding the IED threat being countered is often challenging and can be undertaken by a variety of methods involving many contributors and sources. It ideally involves the development and subsequent sustainment of an IED threat picture.6 One of the key insights that an IED threat picture can provide is an understanding of why and how IEDs are being employed as a tool of criminality, terrorism, insurgency, hybrid warfare7 or open warfare.8 This will be central in informing the subsequent strategic plan that is developed.

The UNIDIR C-IED maturity model tool can be used to assess the maturity or lack thereof, of the key elements in a C-IED enterprise. It is excellent in concept and structure, providing a methodology for analysing the reliability and sustainability of the processes, structures, and capability enabling lines of a C-IED enterprise to counter the use of IEDs. The tool uses a set of five maturity levels, with these increasing as capability improves, to support the qualitative assessment of the stakeholders’ behaviours and competencies as well as the practices, processes, technology and equipment employed to reliably and sustainably respond to and ultimately prevent the use of IEDs. The tool provides a common and consistent mechanism to establish a benchmark, or a set of references, as a basis for comparison as well as a common language and frame of reference for assessing maturity and progress of C-IED capabilities. It can indicate capability gaps and areas where improvements are needed, thus providing the basis for a roadmap to identify where investment is required through national efforts or international cooperation and assistance. It can also allow the experience and lessons learned by others to be applied, thus reducing the time to introduce improvements. However, it can be challenging in terms of time, resources and expertise needed to employ it effectively. A key to its effective use is to have the most informed and empowered entity lead its employment. Such an entity needs to have the necessary influence and empowerment to have the required stakeholder community contribute to the C-IED enterprise, who will then engage with the UNIDIR tool. The information obtained from such a baseline assessment can be used to inform the development of the strategic plan for the C-IED enterprise.

STRATEGIC PLAN DEVELOPMENT

A strategic plan to countering the use of IEDs requires simultaneous and synchronized C-IED efforts at the tactical / technical, operational and strategic / policy levels. This requires a strategy that is coordinated and executed through the appropriate resourcing of the C-IED efforts chosen to be invested in. Ideally the C-IED efforts invested in should be mutually supporting and reinforcing, to effectively and efficiently respond to and ultimately prevent IED use.

There are various processes by which a strategic plan can be developed, in support of a C-IED enterprise, with the framework of ends-ways-means9 an effective one.10 According to Harry Yarger in his article, ‘Toward a Theory of Strategy’ in Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy published in 2006, Art Lykke gave a coherent form to a theory of strategy with his articulation of a three-legged stool model of strategy which illustrated strategy = ends + ways + means. In the Lykke model, the ‘ends’ are the objectives (or goal), the ‘ways’ are the concepts, and the ‘means’ are the resources for supporting the concepts. In Lykke’s ends-ways-means model each part is needed to support the other for the overall strategy to be balanced. If the parts of the Lykke model are not in balance, there is an assumption of greater risk of ineffective strategy.

The requirement for balance between the three parts within a C-IED enterprise needs to be kept in mind throughout the design and subsequent sustainment of a C-IED enterprise. The desired ‘ends’ of a C-IED enterprise will be influenced by how IEDs are being employed, i.e. criminal, terrorist, insurgency, hybrid warfare or possibly open warfare use,11 which will in turn influence the legal framework under which the C-IED enterprise will operate. An enterprise’s legal framework will impact the ‘ways’ it will operate which determines the C-IED efforts that are invested in. The ideal C-IED efforts required can be identified in this logical stepwise approach; however, the actual C-IED efforts invested in will be determined by the ‘means’ that are available. Compromise and prioritisation are critical in this process. This gives an indication of the interdependencies of the ‘ends’, ‘ways’ and ‘means’ using the Lykke model for strategy and the need for balance between them.

Figure 2: Three-legged stool model of balanced strategy.

THE ENDS OF A STRATEGIC PLAN – OVERARCHING STRATEGIC GOAL

Employing an ends-ways-means approach to a C-IED enterprise, involves firstly identifying and then working toward a desired end-state. The desired end-state of a C-IED enterprise refers to the overarching strategic goal that the enterprise wants to achieve. The goal of a C-IED enterprise should ideally fulfil the SMART criteria12 that are often applied when considering objectives. In doing so, a balance is required between being visionary in what the C-IED enterprise should try to achieve, while at the same time being realistic of what is most likely to be achievable. It is important to not become overly focused on assessed obstacles and inhibitors to success but to focus on what success looks like. In this sense, one may consider the overarching strategic goal to be a vision statement13 of what success may look like. This may be a goal that seeks to reduce the impact and effectiveness of IED employment, thus forcing an IED system to evolve and change their tactical employment of IEDs and or their technical sophistication in a manner that will be advantageous to the C-IED enterprise. Alternatively, it may be more ambitious, seeking to prevent the use of IEDs when done so in collaboration with other security, defence and development initiatives, as may be the case if a whole-of-society approach to a C-IED enterprise is adopted. Or it may be more modest in working toward containing the use of IEDs to a certain level to create the space for other stabilization,14 peacemaking15 or security development initiatives to mature. Overall, in determining the goal it is important to appreciate that a C-IED enterprise will typically be part of wider security, defence, or development initiatives. Achieving the balance between vision and realism when developing an overarching strategic goal can be assisted by considering what good enough may be.

Figure 3: Interdependencies of the ends-ways-means in a C-IED enterprise.

 

THE ‘WAYS’ OF A STRATEGIC PLAN

In considering the ‘ways’ of a C-IED enterprise, it is necessary to firstly assess, how IEDs are being employed, i.e. criminal, terrorist, insurgency, hybrid warfare or possibly open warfare use. For example, in a situation where IEDs are in use as a tool of criminality to intimidate, injure or kill, the goal may simply be to prevent the use or threatened use of IEDs through existing criminal justice infrastructure. In more complex conflicts involving terrorism, insurgency or open warfare, IEDs are likely to be one of multiple threats being countered. In such complex scenarios, the C-IED efforts invested in will likely form part of wider security strategies which may themselves come under broader stabilisation and even state building efforts. In such cases, C-IED efforts invested in may be part of counterterrorism, counterinsurgency or combat responses16 to wider instability or conflict. Once, how IEDs are being employed is understood, potential ‘ways’ or C-IED efforts for the C-IED enterprise to invest in, can be identified. Identification of potential ‘C-IED efforts for an enterprise can involve deciding on:

  • Required legal framework under which the C-IED enterprise will operate17 – based upon the assessed employment of IEDs;
  • Constraints or limitations imposed upon the C-IED enterprise;
  • Lead entity with overall responsibility for the enterprise identified and empowered;18,19
  • Idealised C-IED efforts, aligned to the overarching strategic goal.

When deciding the C-IED efforts to be invested in, the author has previously proposed the need for them to fit the challenging criteria of being:20

  • Simple for implementation, in often challenging operational environments, by practitioners with a wide array of training, education, skills and ability levels;
  • Agile and responsive enough to respond to the likely evolution in the IED threat;21
  • Realistic in terms of resources allocated to support its requirements;
  • Timely and responsive in addressing and countering the use of IEDs.22

THE ‘MEANS’ OF A STRATEGIC PLAN

The ‘means’ of a C-IED enterprise, refers to the resources needed to support the ‘ways’ of the strategy.23 While each part of an ends-ways-means approach to C-IED strategy, is equally important, the ‘means’ is often the part that can be most challenging to initially determine and subsequently manage. The effective and efficient management of the resources invested is the key to optimizing any C-IED enterprise. The initial resource investment needed for a given C-IED effort, should at a minimum consider the required financial, time and expertise required. However, other resources may also need to be considered in support of the required capability development. The scale that a C-IED effort will be needed at, will also need to be considered to assess the required capacity24 generation. Certain tools can be employed to assist in C-IED efforts that involve capability development. For example, the US Army’s C-IED strategy of 2022 advocates for the “active and continuous participation in DOTMLPF-P activities.”25,26 Alternative frameworks include the UK’s defence lines of development, TEPIDOIL model27,28 consisting of training, equipment, personnel, information, doctrine and concepts, organization, infrastructure, and logistics. The Finnish Defence Forces’ PMDOI capability model29 considers capability as a system of personnel, materiel, doctrine,30 organization, and information. The author previously31 proposed the use of the FILLED-OIL-TIPP headings when assessing C-IED enterprise capabilities and gaps. FILLED-OIL-TIPP is an acronym for Finances/ Funding sources – Infrastructure – Logistics – Legal framework – Equipment – Doctrine & concepts – Organisation – Interoperability – Leadership – Training – Information – Personnel – Policy. It can be used as a tool to support the assessment of capabilities and associated capacities available to respond to and ultimately prevent the use of IEDs.

From such an assessment, the ‘means’ required for the ideal C-IED efforts can be determined. However, ideal means are rarely available, for example, it is unlikely that the required budgets, expertise and time will be available for all the ideal C-IED efforts identified for investment. By comparing the means required for the ideal C-IED efforts to the actual means that are available, a gap analysis can be undertaken. Such gap analysis can indicate the shortfalls which may exist between required and available resources. This can then inform the decisions needed in terms of compromising between ideal C-IED efforts and the actual C-IED efforts which will be invested in. Such compromises can often involve one or more of the following options:

  • Prioritization of certain C-IED efforts over others, appreciating the likely impact such changes will have on the overall C-IED enterprise;
  • Provision of additional resources from elsewhere within the organization, state or region i.e. prioritization of certain C-IED efforts over other local, state or regional initiatives that need to be resourced;
  • Re-examination of the ways of the C-IED enterprise, which may involve adding or removing certain constraints or limitations;
  • In extremis, adjusting the overarching strategic goal, which will have a cascade effect on the ways and means across the C-IED enterprise;
  • A combination of these options.

Such an approach to identifying the C-IED efforts to be invested in, provides a method to determine what is achievable from the available ‘means’, thus informing a balanced strategic plan between its ‘ends’, ‘ways’ and ‘means’. In achieving such balance, a strategic plan that is manageable and optimised to the overarching strategic goal is enabled. Such an approach informs capability development and capacity generation requirements of the ‘means’ needed and where they are to be invested in an enterprise.

Figure 4: Identifying the C-IED Efforts to be invested in.

 

OPERATIONALISATION

The process of operationalising a C-IED strategic plan involves capturing it in a suitable document(s) and subsequently communicating it to the C-IED enterprise stakeholders. Capturing the strategic plan involves detailing the actionable and measurable C-IED activities and associated procedures, at the tactical/ technical, outlining the operational processes to support the C-IED efforts invested in and how these all are aligned and coordinated to support the overarching strategic goal along with the allocated resources across all levels. Any document(s), which captures how the C-IED enterprise intends to achieve its overarching strategic goal and serves to coordinate the constituent C-IED efforts that contribute to the enterprise in an optimised manner, can fulfil this role. It should ideally provide a roadmap to achieving the overarching strategic goal, working through the identified ‘ways’ and within the allocated ‘means’. The document should make the abstract strategic plan into practical and executable C-IED activities.

It can be separate or a combined dedicated C-IED strategy document and associated action plan, or one or other of these. However, multiple other documents such as policy documents, doctrines, and policy statements can fulfil this requirement.32 In researching this topic, a key informant interviewee stated, “what good strategy looks like can be a challenging to define; however, those strategic documents that have proven to be effective typically communicate succinctly its why (what is intended to be done) and who must do what and by when.”33 Once the strategic plan for C-IED enterprise has been captured it needs to be communicated with the stakeholder community who make up the C-IED enterprise.

CONCLUSION

This paper presents a three component, contextually adaptable, framework intended to support the design of an appropriate C-IED enterprise to effectively and efficiently respond to and ultimately prevent IED use in line with a chosen approach involving various C-IED efforts and within available means. This framework involves a baseline assessment to ascertain the IED threat being countered as well as to assess existing current capabilities along with their capacities as well as those capabilities needing to be developed which the C-IED enterprise will require. Following a baseline assessment, using an ends-ways-means model, a strategic plan for C-IED enterprise can be designed. Once designed it needs to be operationalized and subsequently communicated to the C-IED stakeholder community through an appropriate document(s). This design framework for a C-IED enterprise, provides a platform by which an enterprise is best positioned to implement its strategic plan in a manner that it is most likely to effectively and efficiently respond to and ultimately prevent IED use.■

 

FOOTNOTES

  1. Necessity of a Designated Lead Entity within National C-IED Enterprises, The Counter-IED Report, Spring / Summer 2024 edition, p.27. Nesting C-IED Appropriately within a State’s National Security Architecture, The Counter-IED Report, Spring / Summer 2024 edition, p.35.
  2. The combination of people, processes, and material that go into supporting, funding, procuring, manufacturing, transporting, targeting, preparing, emplacing, executing, and publicising any element of an IED incident, including the indoctrination, training, and life support of the persons involved.
  3. Countering IED threats, refers to at least matching but ideally overmatching the threat posed by the use or threatened use of IEDs.
  4. C-IED elements can be considered as the parts which collectively combine to make up a C-IED enterprise. They may in some cases be individual C-IED efforts, or several C-IED efforts combined, while certain C-IED efforts may span more than one element of an enterprise.
  5. The author has previously proposedA 15 elements to form the basis of a C-IED enterprise based upon a synthesis of the UNIDIR C-IED SAT, the IGAD regional C-IED strategy, the AU C-IED strategy and research conducted by the author in East Africa. NOTE A: Building the C-IED enterprise to counter the IED system, The Counter-IED Report, Winter 2023 / 2024 edition.
  6. An IED threat picture is an assessment of the potential use of IEDs in a defined geographical area by a stated IED system in terms of the technical complexity and tactical sophistication along with the intent of their employment, the IED system’s capabilities, the opportunities for IED attacks along with local factors.
  7. Hybrid warfare is a military strategy that blends conventional warfare, irregular warfare, and cyber warfare with other methods like fake news, diplomacy, and economic pressure. The goal is to create ambiguity and confusion, making it difficult for the adversary to respond effectively. A State may employ IEDs as part of the irregular warfare component of hybrid warfare, through IED attacks which are not attributable to the given adversary, or it is unclear who is responsible.
  8. A situation where combat is conducted in a direct and overt manner, as opposed to covert operations or guerrilla tactics. In open warfare, both sides are clearly identifiable and engage in traditional battlefield tactics
  9. The author has previously outlined the use of an ends-ways-mean approach in the development of a seven-question framework which was applied to identify C-IED strategic principles, in C-IED Strategic principles for East Africa, The Counter-IED Report, Autumn 2023 edition
  10.  The author acknowledges that Lykke’s ends-ways-means strategy model provides an incomplete approach to strategic C-IED, as it fails to comprehend all its necessary dimensions. For example, there are many who deride the Lykke model for strategy, with Jeffrey W. Meiser authoring an article in Parameter in Winter 2016-2017 edition, entitled, ‘Are Our Strategic Models Flawed? Ends + Ways + Means = (Bad) Strategy.’ However, it is a framework widely used to develop strategy and can be employed and adapted to suit the context it is being applied to.
  11. The author posits that countering the use of IEDs in warfare, typically involves purely military efforts, possibly only combat engineering or equivalent assets along with weapons technical intelligence activities. As such it does not typically constitute a C-IED enterprise as has been presented herein; however, a combat engineering approach may at times be necessary within a C-IED enterprise.
  12. Criteria that are Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant and Time-Bound. SMART criteria are often used to determine whether an indicator is strong and useful for monitoring purpose. Source: SSR in a Nutshell, Manual for Introductory Training on SSR, DCAF/ ISSAT 2012
  13. In this case, a vision statement can outline what a C-IED enterprise would like to achieve, describing an idealistic and inspirational vision of its purpose, values, and goal. It can serve as a guiding principle for the enterprise’s actions and decisions and should reflects its long-term aspirations
  14. A holistic approach aimed at improving security, justice, and overall stability in conflict-affected regions.
  15. Deliberate actions and strategies aimed at resolving conflicts, reducing violence, and establishing conditions for lastingpeace.
  16. The 2023 IGAD C-IED strategy, speaks of the war model approach to countering IED use which may be more suited for high- threat IED threat environments that are non-permissive to state security forces.
  17. The author has previously written on this topic in Legally empowered C-IED enterprises, The Counter-IED Report, Winter 2023 /2024 edition.
  18. The author has previously written on this topic in Necessity of a Designated Lead Entity within National C-IED Enterprises, The Counter-IED Report, Spring / Summer 2024 edition.
  19. Individual C-IED efforts, bundled under programmes and enterprises with portfolio structures may need to have sub-lead entities designated to them.
  20. These challenging criteria for C-IED efforts to attain, contribute to making the management of a C-IED enterprise complex.
  21. The requirement for C-IED efforts to be agile, implicitly requires the C-IED enterprise to effectively monitor their effectiveness and evaluate them to ensure they remain threat aligned. Monitoring and evaluation within a C-IED enterprise will detect suchIED threat evolution.
  22. Investing in and sustaining timely and responsive C-IED efforts is a challenging endeavour, being notably labour intensive;however, it is essential that benefits of the investments made are seen to deliver results in terms of effectively responding to and ultimately preventing IED incidents in an acceptable and often relatively short time frame. Such time frames can be driven by political or project management timelines.
  23. The author has previously written how the ‘means’ involve considering the question, ‘what resources we need to accomplish each effect’ or alternatively, ‘what resources the C-IED efforts require’ in C-IED Strategic principles for East Africa, The Counter-IED Report, Autumn 2023 edition.
  24. Capacity refers to the means of an individual/organization to perform assigned duties effectively. This includes human capacity (individual and collective competencies and experience), physical capacity (appropriate assets) and institutional capacity (systems, structures and organisational culture in place)
  25. US DoD. 2022. “Army C-IED Strategy.” Washington DC: US DoD, February, Page 18.
  26. DOTMLPF-P pronounced “Dot-MiL-P-F,” is the acronym for the US DoD model representing categories of ‘solutions’ such as,products and services, required to create an operational capability. It stands for the activities of Doctrine, Organization,Training, Materiel, Leadership and education, Personnel, Facilities and Policy.
  27. UK Ministry of Defence. How Defence Works. Ver. 4.2. 2015.
  28. Park S-G, Lee T-G, Lim N, Son H-S. Integrated framework and methodology for capability priority decisions. Information andSecurity: An International Journal, Volume 25, 2010, 78-98.
  29. Koivisto J, Ritala R, Vilkko M. Conceptual model for capability planning in a military context – A systems thinking approach. Systems Engineering. 2022; 25: 457–474. https://doi.org/10.1002/sys.21624
  30. Including tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP).
  31. The Author has previously written on the legal empowerment of C-IED enterprise in Legally empowered C-IED enterprises,The Counter-IED Report, Winter 2023 / 2024 edition, p. 30-31.
  32. Identifying Counter Improvised Explosive Device Strategic Principles for East Africa, Paul Amoroso, MA Strategic Studies Thesis, National University of Ireland, Cork, School of History, September 2022.
  33. Ibid.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Paul Amoroso is an explosive hazards specialist and has extensive experience as an IED Threat Mitigation Policy Advisor working in East and West Africa. He served in the Irish Army as an IED Disposal and CBRNe officer, up to MNT level, and has extensive tactical, operational, and strategic experience in Peacekeeping Operations in Africa and the Middle East. He has experience in the development of doctrine and policy and was one of the key contributors to the United Nations Improvised Explosive Device Disposal Standards and the United Nations Explosive Ordnance Disposal Military Unit Manual. He works at present in the MENA region on SALW control as well as in wider Africa advising on national and regional C-IED strategies. He has a MSc in Explosive Ordnance Engineering and an MA in Strategic Studies. He runs a consultancy, Assessed Mitigation Options (AMO), which provides advice, support, and training delivery in EOD, C-IED, WAM as well as Personal Security Awareness Training (PSAT) and Hostile Environment Awareness Training (HEAT). This article reflects his own views and not necessarily those of any organisation he has worked for or with in developing these ideas. LinkedIn profile: https://www.linkedin.com/in/paul-amoroso-msc-ma-miexpe-60a63a42/

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Counter-IED Report, Autumn 2024