Infrastructure and commercial projects: EO clearance and risk management

By Dr Robert Keeley, RK Consulting (EOD) Ltd

INTRODUCTION

International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) have become the benchmark for humanitarian mine action since they were first introduced nearly a quarter of a century ago. Yet they don’t fit exactly into commercial clearance work.

The aim of this paper is to explore the differences between humanitarian and commercial perspectives, how they both influence attitudes to the clearance of commercial projects and infrastructure. The paper also makes recommendations on best practice for EO risk management on infrastructure and commercial projects, drawing on the relevant elements of IMAS where possible.

THE HUMANITARIAN PERSPECTIVE

It may be useful to start with a definition of ‘humanitarian’. For this it is possible to refer to two different United Nations (UN) General Assembly resolutions, namely:

  • 46/182 (19 Dec 1991)
  • 58/114 (5 Feb 2004)

These describe humanitarian action as having four principles, which are:

  • Neutrality
  • Humanity
  • Impartiality
  • Independence (added 2004)

The principles have been defined in an elaboration by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)1, as set out in Table 1 below.

Table 1. OCHA elaboration on humanitarian action.

When one also takes into account the language of the 1997 Anti-Personnel Landmine Ban Convention (APMBC), and the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), there is a clear requirement to clear all contamination. For example, CCM says in Article 4:

“Each State Party undertakes to clear and destroy, or ensure the clearance and destruction of, cluster munition remnants located in cluster munition contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control… not later than ten years from [its entry into force}.

It is generally accepted that the only limitation on humanitarian mine action is the availability of funding. Much of the focus of humanitarian mine action has therefore been on fundraising. However, this imperative to clear all contamination does not apply to commercial projects, which, by their very nature, will only be interested in clearing contamination relevant to their activities.

THE COMMERCIAL PERSPECTIVE
Definitions

When exploring the commercial perspective, it is worth defining non-profit and for-profit organisations. These definitions, from the United States Chamber of Commerce2, are set out in Box 1 below.

Box 1. Definitions of non-profit and for-profit organisations.

It should also be remembered that non-profit and for- profit organisations are likely to have different tax obligations, depending on (a) where they are registered and (b) where they are working.

There are three other useful concepts that are usefully defined here. These are ‘infrastructure’3 and the economic concepts of ‘public good’4 and ‘market failure’5. These are defined in Box 2 below.

Box 2. Definitions of infrastructure, public good and market failure.

Economic perspective on mine action

Taking all of these definitions together, humanitarian mine action can be described as a form of market failure, as it is a product where the intended beneficiary is not the customer. Not least because most beneficiaries could not afford to meet the full cost of the services. Commercial mine action activities, on the other hand, have a conventional buyer-seller relationship. These two models are represented graphically in Figure 1 below. Infrastructure projects may be public goods as defined in Box 2 above, but, as will be discussed below, they should be regarded in the same light as commercial projects in that they require focused, project-oriented action rather than the clearance of all EO contamination.

Figure 1. Behaviour of the market in (A) commercial or (B) humanitarian mine action.

Therefore, using these definitions, there is no objective reason why commercial mine clearance organisations cannot undertake humanitarian clearance projects, or indeed why mine action NGO should not bid on commercial projects. Both types of organisation will have different legal and tax liabilities of course, but those are beyond the scope of this paper. Some thoughts on how NGO should treat their pricing of commercial or infrastructure bids are nevertheless set out in Table 2 below.

Table 2. NGO clearance of infrastructure or private land: possible pricing arrangements

Economic perspectives on project management

Commercial and infrastructure projects, whether they be private or public sector, are governed to a very large degree by the return they will bring on their initial investment. This return is measured by a number of economic concepts including:

  • The discount rate
  • Internal rate of return (IRR)
  • Net Present Value (NPV)

Brief definitions6 of these are given in Box 3 below.

Box 3. Economic terms used in project management.

The key points from these definitions are that (a) costs paid for using today’s money and (b) today’s money is worth less than tomorrow’s money. Furthermore, because clearance is typically a preliminary activity it is particularly expensive. A graphical representation7 of the decreasing value of money over time is shown at Figure 2.

Figure 2. An example of the effect of discounting on the future value of money.

Thus, any demand by commercial projects will depend on their exposure to risk. This is discussed in more detail below.

A formal definition of risk

People often use the terms ‘risk’, hazard’ and ‘threat’ interchangeably. However, risk is a mathematical concept and as such has a formal definition. IMAS 04.108 gives a version of that definition, which it takes from ISO Guide 51:1999:

A “combination of the probability of occurrence of harm and the severity of that harm”.

Expressed formally, this takes the following form:

R = f(ip, os)

Where R = risk, ip is the probability of the incidence and Os is the severity of the outcome. Practically speaking, risk can also be considered a function of hazard plus activity: it doesn’t matter how contaminated an area is if nobody goes there (from a risk perspective).

This can be used in something called an ‘expected monetary value’ (EMV) calculation which can be used to compare the cost of taking a precaution with the potential cost of an outcome should that precaution not be taken. Use of an EMV calculation is explained in more detail in International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG) 02.109 Para 15.1.

Attitudes to risk

Risk calculations help determine a project’s exposure to risk. However, they do not fully explain people’s (or institutions’) attitudes to risk. These generally range from risk-averse to risk seeker, but on many occasions the commercial mine action service provider encounters clients who are tolerant of the potential risk from EO contamination. Figure 3 sets out a graphical representation of the spectrum of different attitudes to risk10.

Figure 3. The spectrum of different attitudes to risk.

Incidentally, those familiar with the provision of explosive ordnance risk education (EORE) will recognise where the two categories of risk-taking behaviour11 (the intentional and the reckless) fit on this spectrum.

It may seem strange to outsiders that any commercial project could be tolerant of a risk from EO. The principles behind project finance and EMV go some way to explain that. Mine action is an expensive, up-front activity to manage a hazard (EO) that may not actually impact the project and may not actually even be present. However, there is another dimension, which is that EO poses different types of risk, not all of which act in the same direction. This is best explained using the ‘Bow Tie’ risk management tool12, as set out in Figure 4.

Figure 4. Assembling the EO risk bowtie (1). Identifying the potential consequences.

In a ‘bow tie’ risk diagram everything starts at the centre with the hazard and the incident. IMAS 04.10 lso gives a useful definition of hazard, which it also takes from ISO Guide 51:1999:

A “potential source of harm”.

It also defines incident thus:

“an event that gives rise to an accident or has the potential to lead to an accident”.

In this context, the hazard is the (potential) presence of EO and the incident is an incident arising from contact with that EO. At first it is only necessary to set out the right-hand side of the ‘bow tie’, namely the consequences. The left-hand side can be completed later. These can be separated into three different potential consequences, which are defined below:

  • Physical risk. Death, injury or damage to property or equipment arising from an EO incident.
  • Project risk. Delays or additional costs arising from an EO incident
  • Reputational risk. The damage to a project or a project implementer’s reputation amongst relevant stakeholders, arising from an EO incident, with potential to affect future engagement (such as the allocation of future funding or the awarding of subsequent contracts).

Whereas both physical and reputational risk would tend to make a project more risk averse, project risk (as defined here) has the potential to pull in both directions. Project managers must decide on the balance of risk between the cost of preventative action and the potential cost of an incident and for unplanned delays. This is exacerbated by the higher cost of preliminary activities as described in the discussions on discounting above. The potential implication of this need to balance risks is illustrated in the case study described in Box 4 below.

Box 4. A real case study of the effect of EO clearance costs on a commercial project.

The example as set out in Box 4 above a critical thing about clearance of commercial projects (or infrastructure). Unlike humanitarian projects – especially ones focussed on compliance with the two conventions – clearance per se is not the focus; rather, EO clearance is an enabler to allow the wider goals of the project to be achieved in a safe and timely manner. The focus of EO-related activities on this wider project Schwerpunkt will be discussed in more detail in the section on ‘scope of works’ below.

One final point that should be introduced here is the question of liability. This is not the place to discuss the legal aspects of risk and in any event a project’s legal exposure will vary depending on the relevant national laws. But in general, it is reasonable to say that both physical risk and reputational risk will enter into considerations of liability.

Managing risk

The perspective of the mine action sector on the management of risk is set out in IMAS 07.14. However, it is suggested that this is largely seen through the humanitarian lens.

Mine action practitioners will recognise that the commercial demining company described in Box 4 presented a false dichotomy to their potential client. Full clearance was not the only option available. A risk management approach could have been taken. Before this risk management approach is discussed it is necessary again to introduce some definitions, drawn from the International Standards Organisation (ISO)13, as follows:

  • Risk analysis. Risk analysis is the ‘systematic use of available information to identify hazards and to estimate the risk’.
  • Risk assessment. Risk assessment is the ‘overall process comprising [risk identification,] a risk analysis and a risk evaluation’. Some sources interchange ‘analysis’ and ‘assessment’.
  • Risk evaluation. Risk evaluation is the ‘process based on risk analysis to determine whether the tolerable risk [will be] achieved’.
  • Risk management. Risk management is the proactive control and evaluation of risks via policies and management decisions.

The overall risk management process can be represented graphically, as shown in Figure 5 below.

Figure 5. Graphical representation of the risk management process (ISO 13000/2018)

In some countries, there are already regulations and/or best practice guides are already in place. For example, in the United Kingdom there are two guides published by the Construction Industry Research and Information Association (CIRIA), namely CIRIA Report C681 and CIRIA Report C785. In Germany there is the Construction guidelines for explosive ordnance clearance (BFR KMR) (‘Kampfmittelräumung (BFR KMR) Baufachliche Richtlinien’ in the original German). In Vietnam there is a regulation called Decree No. 18/2019/ND-CP.

In circumstances where there are no specific regulations or where existing regulations do not provide sufficient guidance, the following four-step risk management process is proposed:

  1. Risk assessment
  2. Non-technical survey (NTS)
  3. Technical survey (TS) (including area reduction)
  4. Full clearance

Note that full clearance is only recommended if all previous steps suggest it is necessary. It is, in effect, the risk management option of last resort.

There is no need to describe steps 2-4 in detail here. These are covered in detail in the various relevant IMAS or national technical standard or guideline (NTSG). The main issue is to understand how an initial risk assessment might work and how the findings might trigger subsequent mine action activities.

Risk assessment part one: risk identification

Risk identification in this context is a simple check to identify any potential historical evidence of EO contamination in the country (or region if possible). This can normally be done as a desk study.

Risk assessment part two: risk analysis

If the potential project is in a contaminated country or region, the next step in the risk assessment process is to determine how close it is to any recorded contaminated areas or any previously cleared areas. The analysis process should try to identify the presence of any indicators (direct or indirect) of the presence of EO contamination.

The presence of any indicators will suggest the need for further action. This would follow the same principles as ‘land release’ in humanitarian mine action, i.e. proceeding from an NTS via area reduction to clearance of any remaining contamination identified within the project area. However, in commercial projects some decisions have to be taken about the need to go further down this path. This is ‘risk evaluation’.

This risk assessment procedure can be visualised as a form of a conventional ‘risk matrix’ as set out in Figure 6 below. Note that it includes the unfortunately rather common situation where a site is already in use before the EO risk assessment is undertaken.

The first key point brought out by Figure 6 is that activity affects risk. A project site not in use presents a different category of risk to one that is already in use. The second point is that any project falling into the grey category will depend on the client’s appetite for risk. Likewise, the implications of a site falling into the brown category will be very context specific. Finally, it is recommended that any project that is ‘red’ will need immediate action, including stopping work until contamination is treated.

Figure 6. A form of EO risk matrix for commercial projects.

This risk matrix highlights the importance of the client’s appetite for risk. This is discussed above but not something that is normally considered in humanitarian mine action (HMA). In HMA the evidence of absence as is implied in land release as a form of ‘triage’, i.e. of being sufficient in itself as a reason not to clear. This may be pragmatic in HMA where, as described above, there is a form of ‘market failure’ (i.e. the beneficiary of the clearance is not the customer (the donor is)) and may also be reasonable where the land is already in use for several years. However, as said by Carl Sagan, “the absence of evidence is not the same as evidence of absence”, and in a commercial context the absence of evidence may be necessary but not sufficient. This leads to the recommended best practice for EO risk treatment as set out in Table 3.

Table 3. Recommended risk management/treatment approach for commercial project sites

One relevant concept in risk management is that of ‘Source-Pathway-Receptor’ (SPR)14. These are defined in Box 5 below.

Box 5. Definitions of source, pathway and receptor as used in environmental risk management.

In the context of EO contamination it is the EO hazard that is the source of risk. The pathway is the activity conducted on a project site (either during construction or during use) and the receptor is the construction workforce, the construction equipment and the personnel who are the end-users of the project. As an example, a site in a region that has been subjected to aerial attack has different sources of hazard than one that is being built in an area that was mined, and pathways would be different in an area where foundations are required to be dug, compared to an area where people just needed to walk. This has implications for the scope of works of EO risk treatment, as discussed below. Similarly, battle area clearance using visual surface search may be sufficient, depending on context. A matrix showing how the SPR concept could be used in a project potentially contaminated with EO is included at Annex A.

SCOPE OF WORKS

One area where project managers can reduce the costs of clearance (and hence change the balance of project risk) is to limit (and clearly define) the scope of works for a project. This will also have the benefit of reducing both physical and reputational risks from project personnel wandering out of a cleared area and having an accident involving EO outside of the project area.

Thus, project managers should provide mine clearance contractors with a detailed large-scale map of the project task site with the boundaries clearly defined. It should also include the following where these fall outside the finished boundary of the project site:

  • Stores/laydown areas
  • Parking areas
  • Temporary site office space
  • Work room for heavy plant
  • Access routes

Also, thought needs to be given to the depth of clearance. Clearance agencies have three techniques available to them, namely:

  • Surface (visual) search
  • Shallow instrument search
  • Deep instrument search

In short, the deeper the search the longer it takes and the more it costs. Search depths for shallow instrument search are normally set by the national mine action authority (NMAA); the international norm as set out in IMAS is (at the time of writing) 13cm. Deep instrument search is usually possible with handheld equipment down to 3m but can be deeper if boreholes are drilled. It should be noted that usually only aircraft bombs penetrate this deeply: for example, it is not unknown to find a large aircraft bomb at a depth of 20m, though this is admittedly rare. Deep search is very slow and expensive and should be limited to areas where foundations are to be dug and where there is a credible EO threat. The SPR process set out above helps determine the appropriate response to potential EO hazards.

Consider again the story set out in Box 4. If the clearance organisation had employed the four-step process set out here, and encouraged the client to provide a limited scope of works, a range of more positive scenarios could have unfolded, including:

“We’ve done an NTS of your site and there is no evidence of contamination. You could consider the following actions to deal with residual risk…”

“We’ve looked at your site and have identified that only a small portion is contaminated. If you can work without that area we can mark and fence it off so that your project staff don’t wander into it.”

“We’ve looked at your site and have identified that only a small portion is contaminated. It will cost $X to clear that area”

Quite frankly, if the clearance organisation had said any of these things there is a very good chance that they would have got the work. As it was, they got nothing. Thus, a proper risk management approach is a ‘win-win’ for both the client and the clearance organisation.

Conversely, work to clear the oilfields in Kuwait in 1991 was an example of how a defined scope of works facilitated what was otherwise a very difficult project. The firefighters worked out that they needed an access lane of 30 metres for each well fire, and a defined working area around each fire. Clearance work was done mainly to identify cluster munition strikes and the primary search technique was a surface visual search. See Figure 7 below.

Figure 7. Dealing with oil fires in Kuwait, 1991. All access and working areas were searched for EO before the firefighters could gain access.

The task planning for the Kuwait employed the ‘minimum operating strip’ concept as used by military airfield damage repair. In other words, what is the minimum work needed to be done in order to get the job done? Thus, even if a 30m access lane passed through a cluster munition strike, no action would be taken against any EO outside of the 30m boundary.

This is a profound conceptual difference to much work undertaken in HMA, which will often tend to follow lines of contamination once these have been identified.

The management of residual risk is discussed below.

It is now possible to complete the left-hand side of the risk management bow tie. This is done by adding the potential ‘contributing factors’. This is shown in Figure 8 below. Three main contributing factors have been identified. These are:

  • The area has not been cleared
  • EO has been found on the site
  • Personnel are unaware of the hazard and/orunaware of safe behaviour

Figure 8. Building the EO risk bowtie. Note the use of quality management measures in the green boxes.

Probability of the incidence

Remembering the formal definition of risk as a function of the probability of the incidence and the severity of the outcome, it is now possible to plot various mine action ‘products’ as means of reducing the probability of the incidence. These can then be broken down in turn to either (a) removing the hazard or (b) changing behaviour.

There are three mine action products that are relevant in commercial work. These are:

  • Area clearance
  • Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)
  • Explosive ordnance risk education (EORE)

These are all defined in IMAS 04.10. However, it is worth noting that all of these focus on reducing the probability of the incidence. EORE does this by modifying behaviour, whilst EOD and area clearance address the presence of a hazard. Area clearance does this prophylactically (an area can be searched even if definite indicators are not present) whilst EOD teams are usually deployed on a reactive basis (after the report of a possible item of EO).

In risk bowties, risk treatment options are drawn as boxes on the various causal arrows. Thus, boxes for the three mine action products have been added to Figure 8.

Quality management

Quality management, consisting of quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC) play an important role in EO risk treatment, in order for the client to be sure that the risk treatment employed is fit for purpose. In the event of an incident, accident investigation is also important as it can identify any root cause (such as an inadequate scope of works) or contributing factors and thus help prevent any future incidents. These quality management measures are shown in the green boxes in Figure 8.

Managing the severity of the outcome

So far this paper has discussed management of the risk probability. However, it is also necessary to treat the severity of the outcome. Three boxes have been added to the right-hand side of Figure 8.

The severity of the outcome of physical risk can be managed to some extent by the timely availability of an adequate first aid capacity able to deal with typical EO injuries. First aid provision is discussed in IMAS 10.40. This will also, for remote sites, require a casualty evacuation plan to a hospital capable of treating typical wounds from EO.

Likewise, treatment of project risk can be done through the application of the ‘scope of work’ principles as set out above. This may necessitate a robust accident investigation procedure to identify any systemic issues with the mine action activities undertaken on the site.

Finally, the severity of reputational risk can be ameliorated when a project can show that it has applied ‘all reasonable effort’ (as discussed in IMAS Technical Note for Mine Action (TNMA) 07.11/03). If a project has established a clear scope of works, and employed relevant risk treatment through area clearance, EOD, and EORE to relevant IMAS and national standards, and where adequate first aid cover is available, then it is held that it can claim to have met the conditions of ‘all reasonable effort’.

MANAGING RESIDUAL RISK

There remains the question of residual risk. This can be thought of in several ways. If the primary treatment of risk is by the prophylactic removal of hazard (within set boundaries to the appropriate standard) then the provision of EORE and an on-call EOD response to recognise and deal with items that still turn up can be considered as one way of managing residual risk. Especially under circumstances where the initial risk assessment suggested that full clearance may not have been necessary (see Figure 6).

However, the second way to deal with residual risk is through insurance. Insurance premiums are assessed though the insurance industry’s own risk management processes, but it is possible that a project that can show compliance with the best practice suggestions set out here may benefit from reduced insurance premiums.

The willingness of an insurer to cover risk for a particular project will depend greatly on a presentation by the organisation (or their insurance broker). The presentation will need to address any questions on the risks and mitigation methods used. A broker that specialises in UXO risk coverage15 reports that potential insurers will “want best practice as a basic requirement”. The broker also stated:

“a poorly presented risk can end up being punitively expensive and/or end up with cover that is inadequate to protect against UXO risks”

Most UXO related risks can be covered by insurance held by the clearance agency and their clients will want to see the relevant policies as part of their due diligence during the contracting process. Site owners and general construction companies can also find insurance cover for personnel and equipment. Ownership of residual risk coverage of UXO finds or incidents after the site has been handed over will depend on legislation and/or NTSG. It is hard for the contractor to maintain responsibility for a site after the clearance work has been completed: who is liable if a worker leaves the cleared area or brings an item of EO onto the site out of curiosity? This may perhaps be included in the clearance agency’s insurance, but it might be more appropriate (and cost effective) to mitigate onward liability by a comprehensive quality assurance and handover process. In other words, in such an arrangement the liability of the clearance agency ends at site handover. ■

FOOTNOTES
  1. Source: OCHA on Message: Humanitarian Principles, November 2011
    https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/dms/Documents/v.2.%20website%20overview%20tab%20link%202%20Humanitarian%20Principles.pdf
  2. https://www.uschamber.com/co/start/strategy/nonprofit-vs-not-for-profit-vs-for-profit
  3. https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/infrastructure#google_vignette
  4. Source: https://languages.oup.com/google-dictionary-en/
  5. https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/market-failure
  6. https://dictionary.cambridge.org/
  7. https://www.finyear.com/On-Investors-and-Discount-Rates_a35557.html
  8. https://www.mineactionstandards.org/standards/04-10/
  9. https://data.unsaferguard.org/iatg/en/IATG-02.10-Introduction-risk-management-IATG-V.3.pdf
  10. https://www.managementyogi.com/2022/04/risk-attitude-and-risk-attitude-spectrum.html
  11. First set out in a UNICEF handbook in 2005.
  12. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/bowtie-a-visual-tool-to-keep-an-overview-of-risk-management-practices
  13. https://www.iso.org/standard/65694.html
  14. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/land-contamination-risk-management-lcrm/lcrm-stage-1-risk-assessment#uxo

  15. Correspondence with Jonathan Starkey of Specialist Risk Group, March 2025.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Dr. Robert Keeley is a former British Army Bomb Disposal Officer active in humanitarian and commercial mine action and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) since 1991. He has worked in numerous countries and for several governments and international organisations. He specializes in project design, evaluation, and quality assurance of all aspects of mine action and has helped shape the emerging humanitarian improvised explosive device (IED) sector. Dr. Keeley is a member of the Institute of Explosives Engineers, a Member of the International Association of Bomb Technicians and Investigators, and is a Fellow of the Royal Geographical Society. He holds a PhD in Applied Environmental Economics; his thesis was on “the Economics of Landmine Clearance.”

Contact Information

Dr. Robert Keeley,
Director, RK Consulting (EOD) Ltd
Ashford, Kent, United Kingdom
[email protected]
www.rk-consulting.net

Counter-IED Report, Spring/Summer 2025