Phases within a C-IED enterprise

By Paul Amoroso, an explosive hazards specialist at Assessed Mitigation Options (AMO) consultancy

INTRODUCTION

When the employment of IEDs emerges within a State or region, their use can vary depending on the context which includes, inter alia, criminal, terrorist, insurgency, hybrid warfare1 or open warfare2 use. The author has previously written3 about the development and operationalisation of a C-IED enterprise by an IED affected State. A C-IED enterprise is intended to counter an IED system through developing and sustaining the capabilities and associated capacities4 to respond to and ultimately prevent their employment. The C-IED enterprise that is designed, invested in and sustained will depend on the IED threat being countered and the legal framework under which it operates, which is determined by the way in which IEDs are being employed along with existing C-IED capabilities and capacities thereof. A previous paper published in The Counter-IED Report5 , set out 15 elements6 that can make up a C-IED enterprise which can be broken down into cross-cutting elements, responsive elements and preventative elements.

The author has advocated for a whole-of-society approach to C-IED as being the most comprehensive in building a C-IED enterprise, in that it encompasses the broadest number of stakeholders who can effectively respond to and prevent IED incidents. However, for several, often challenging reasons, preventing the use of IEDs is not easily achieved. This paper will examine why there is often a need for a C-IED enterprise to transition between phases as it works toward preventing their use. This is the reason why the author chooses to use the language of a C-IED enterprise working to effectively and efficiently respond to and ultimately prevent IED use. The word ‘ultimately’ is key in that it is often a goal that must be worked toward but is often challenging to achieve and requires different phases within a C-IED enterprise to match a typically evolving threat and the need for the C-IED enterprise to adapt over time.

PREVENTION IS BETTER THAN CURE

Previously it has been stated that ‘as C-IED efforts progressed in various IED affected states and regions, a recurrent lesson has been identified, which is common in most security and counter terrorism initiatives, that prevention is better than cure.’7 A C-IED enterprise should work to both effectively and efficiently respond to as well as ultimately prevent IED use. The preference to prevent IED use, rather than respond to their use, is self-evident in that prevention reduces the number of IED incidents and hence the need for responsive C-IED efforts to be invested in and sustained.

As C-IED develops within an IED affected State, it can initially focus on responsive C-IED efforts along with attack the network activities which target certain IED network personnel, such as those involved in the preparation, emplacement and execution activities involved in IED incidents. However, over the longer term, increased investment in preventative C-IED efforts is deemed to be more effective as responsive efforts typically have little long-term benefit as they fail to proactively and ultimately disrupt and prevent incidents. Over time, increasing investment in preventative efforts, which consider all personnel in an IED network8 along with the processes and materiel supply needed to support IED use, is deemed the best approach. Such targeting of all elements of an IED system can be said to be a widening of the C-IED aperture. A widened C-IED aperture will typically ‘overlap with many other defence, security, stabilization, and development initiatives such as humanitarian mine action, weapons and ammunition management, border control, countering violent extremism, population engagement, counter / deradicalization programs, regional cooperation, counter-terrorist financing / anti- money laundering and broader counter terrorism activities.’9 As the C-IED aperture expands, so too does the number of stakeholders who need to be engaged which is the reason for promoting a whole-of-society approach. While acknowledging that prevention is better than cure when countering the use of IEDs, the adaptation of phases within a C-IED enterprise when pursuing a whole-of-society approach to C-IED is often necessary.

WHOLE-OF-SOCIETY APPROACHES TO C-IED – A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

When considering a comprehensive approach to C-IED, it is important to understand that IEDs are a weapon system and are best viewed as the symptoms of deeper underlying issues which create the conditions or ecosystem leading to their employment. To prevent the use of these weapon systems, it is crucial to first understand and address the underlying factors, problems, grievances and injustices that create the conditions for conflict, insecurity and instability leading to their employment. The root cause for the employment of IEDs can be political or ideological as well as financial or purely criminal. The theory is that if one addresses the root causes, the use of IEDs will be prevented. This typically involves the political will to provide a solution to the problems, injustices and grievances which create such conditions or alternatively achieving compromises that remedy grievances or provide redress to those who employ IEDs.

Many approaches to designing and sustaining a C-IED enterprise are possible, with a whole-of-society approach to a C-IED enterprise being advocated10 as being the most comprehensive and likely to prevent the employment of IEDs in the long term. It involves a broad array of stakeholders contributing to a C-IED enterprise. It can include multiple elements of state security, defence, government departments, ministries, offices, and agencies along with civil society organisations, commercial and industry entities as well as international and regional organizations. Whole-of-society C-IED approaches often have stakeholders with complex institutional structures and procedures requiring internal coherence, a cooperative and collaborative culture between members to support effective C-IED efforts through a shared understanding of the IED threat faced. A whole-of-society approach adopted by a C-IED enterprise aims to be comprehensive by ensuring it can both respond to IED use as well as prevent their use. Prevention is ultimately achieved by addressing the root causes that create the conditions for their use. While advocating for a whole-of-society approach to C-IED, it is acknowledged that, such approaches are not always suitable. Secondly, at times the C-IED enterprise may become overwhelmed by the IED system, forcing it to adapt in ways that may not involve a whole-of-society approach. Thirdly, a whole-of-society approach takes time to mature to the point that the use of IEDs is prevented.

OPEN WARFARE EMPLOYMENT OF IEDs

One of the contexts in which IEDs may be employed is open warfare. IEDs used in open warfare may involve the use of boobytraps11 or clandestine devices12 as well as modified items of explosive ordnance.13 However, it is acknowledged that countering the use of IEDs in warfare, typically involves purely military efforts, possibly employing only combat engineering or equivalent assets along with weapons technical intelligence14 activities. In open warfare, IEDs are one of multiple threats being countered, all of which will be dealt with by conventional military means. As such, it is not typically part of a C-IED enterprise as has been presented herein and the concept of phases of a C-IED enterprise would not be applicable as any efforts to counter IEDs would involve military entities only and only last as long as the war itself. However, as outlined in the section entitled ‘Phases of a C-IED Enterprise,’ a combat engineering approach may at times be necessary within a C-IED enterprise. The use of a ‘war model approach’15 to countering IEDs is discussed later and is not necessarily related to countering the use of IEDs in open warfare.

ADAPTATION OF THE C-IED ENTERPRISE FORCED BY THE IED SYSTEM

At all times, a C-IED enterprise needs to remain effective and efficient in responding to and ultimately preventing IED use. One of the key challenges in the initial design and development and subsequent management of a C-IED enterprise, is that the IED system will evolve to circumvent the C-IED efforts invested in against it. During the initial design and development of a C-IED enterprise, it is necessary to undertake a baseline assessment. One of the reasons for this is to develop an IED threat picture so that that C-IED efforts invested in are threat aligned. However, as an IED system evolves to circumvent the C-IED efforts invested in against it, the IED threat picture will change. A C-IED enterprise needs adaptation as one of its cross- cutting elements with the intent to adapt to IED system evolution, to remain threat aligned and ensure it is effective in responding to and ultimately preventing the employment of IEDs. However, there can be times when the evolution of the IED system overwhelms the ability of a C-IED enterprise to adapt. In such cases it may be necessary for the enterprise to move to a more response focussed approach which may also be more security or defence force centric with a reduced whole- of-society make up.

PREVENTATIVE C-IED EFFORTS TAKE TIME

When a C-IED enterprise takes a whole-of-society approach, it is important to appreciate that the preventative C-IED efforts invested in, typically take longer to mature to show effects on the IED system compared to responsive C-IED efforts. An alternative way of seeing this challenge is that compared to responsive C-IED efforts, preventative C-IED efforts take longer to see a return on investment. Preventative C-IED efforts in the long term are generally less costly and more effective than responsive efforts; however, preventative efforts are generally more resource intensive initially. As such there is the need for political understanding and backing of the benefit of investment in preventive C-IED efforts as comprehensive approaches to addressing the use of IEDs. However, a C-IED enterprise needs to be able to show impact and benefit in terms of reducing the number of IED incidents and increasing the safety and security of the State, its citizens, and interests against the IED system. The author has previously16 discussed the challenge of needing to show such results in the development and sustainment of a C-IED enterprise. These challenges often require an initial emphasis on response focused C-IED efforts with a shift over time to preventative C-IED efforts.

CRAWL-WALK-RUN APPROACH TO PREVENTING THE USE OF IEDs

It has been outlined how preventative C-IED efforts take time to mature to show return on investment compared to responsive C-IED efforts. There is also the competing demand for a C-IED enterprise being able to show impact and benefit in terms of reducing the number of IED incidents and increasing the safety and security of the State, its citizens, and interests against the IED system. This challenge of needing to show impact against an IED system and limited initial investment in preventative efforts, can be even more pronounced in developing States with little or no existing C-IED capabilities and associated capacities. This dichotomy between wanting to invest in preventative C-IED efforts but the typical return on investment taking too long, often requires an initial response focused and even device centric investment with little or no initial investment in preventative C-IED efforts. This often sees the initial scope of a C-IED enterprise to focus on efforts which are security and defence sector centric. This may be an initial short-term phase of the C-IED enterprise.

A good starting point is to focus investment on those C-IED efforts that will have initial impact that can be pointed toward as increasing the safety and security of the State, its citizens, and interests against the IED system. One way to achieve this can be the use of quick impact projects17 when first developing a C-IED enterprise. The benefits of such quick impact projects, include, relatively speedy positive results from investments made, building confidence among the populace and members of the security and defence forces and encouraging further investment from funding sources. This will typically involve greater initial investment in responsive rather than preventative C-IED efforts, involving a military or security centric C-IED stakeholder community, with a C-IED enterprise that is not whole-of-society in its make-up.

When enterprises with an initial focus on responsive C-IED efforts are necessary, the imbalance between responsive and preventative efforts, can in time be addressed through the gradual but continued investment in appropriate and sustainable preventative C-IED efforts. A graduated development of a comprehensive approach to C-IED can involve a progressive expansion over several years to eventually achieve a whole-of- society C-IED enterprise with an appropriate balance of responsive and preventative C-IED efforts. Such a progression from an initial security and defence centric C-IED enterprise which is response focussed to one that is whole-of-society and has an appropriate balance of responsive and preventative C-IED efforts can be considered a crawl-walk-run approach.

A crawl-walk-run approach may involve an initial security sector centric focus which may be considered a crawling point of departure. A progressive expansion over several years to eventually achieve a comprehensive whole-of-society C-IED enterprise can be broken down under a number of phases which may involve short term, medium term, and long-term goals. Such an approach needs to be understood by all stakeholders involved to ensure coherence and in support of expectation management. How this is achieved will be determined by the management structures and practices established. When a comprehensive C-IED enterprise is achieved, space can be created that other security and stability initiatives require, not only in terms of wider state security but also within the political, economic and social domains.

PHASES OF A C-IED ENTERPRISE

In a previous Counter-IED Report paper,18 a framework for the design of a C-IED enterprise was presented involving, a baseline assessment, the development of a strategic plan using an ends-ways-means approach, followed by its operationalisation. For the reasons outlined thus far, it may not be practical to design a C-IED enterprise which is initially focused on those C-IED efforts intended to prevent IED use.

Consequently, there may be phases to countering the use of IEDs in that one goal may be worked toward initially, with the intent in time to transition to another phase with its own defined goal. This process can in theory involve several phase transitions each of which will see the C-IED enterprise being modified to match the goal of each phase. Such phases may vary in duration involving short, medium or long-term goals being worked toward. This approach can facilitate a crawl-walk-run approach to preventing the use of IEDs. However, owing to the dynamic and evolving nature of the IED threat being countered, progress toward preventing the use of IEDs may not always be linear. Instead, phases of a C-IED enterprise may also be necessary to allow it to adapt in a manner which moves it away from a comprehensive whole-of-society approach.

When considering the phases that may be most appropriate for a given C-IED enterprise, each set of phases will vary according to the IED threat, the goal being pursued and the C-IED efforts being invested in. To appreciate the concept of the possible phases of a C-IED enterprise, examining some scenarios can be informative. One scenario could have an emerging IED threat which is addressed through a criminal justice model approach, but their use evolves over time to undermine the State and overwhelm its capacity to counter them. In such a case the C-IED enterprise may need to transition to a counterterrorism approach which is appropriately legally empowered. In situations where the threat significantly escalates, and an insurgency emerges a counterinsurgency approach may need to be adapted and in a worst-case scenario a war model approach may be needed. Such transitions between phases away from a criminal justice approach may be considered as retrograde as the intent should always be for the C-IED efforts invested in, to mature over time, with an ultimate transition to a criminal justice approach. The stepwise retrograde transition outlined from criminal justice, to counterterrorism, to counterinsurgency and on to a war model approach may not be appropriate or possible in all scenarios. Alternatively, there is the potential to transition from a criminal justice model approach straight to a counterinsurgency or war model approach. When a State first faces an IED threat, there is also the possibility of initially adapting a counter- terrorist, counterinsurgency or war model approach, rather than a criminal justice model approach.19

In another scenario, the C-IED enterprise might initially adopt a war model approach, viewing IEDs as counter-mobility obstacles. This perspective becomes particularly relevant in cases where a State has limited or no existing C-IED capabilities and associated capacities. As such, adopting a combat engineering approach to countering them may be the initial focus. An investment in explosive ordnance disposal and weapons technical intelligence capabilities would be an example of C-IED efforts that may be prioritised in this example. Such a combat engineering phase would have an associated goal. For example, within a stated geographic area, this could involve, securing the main supply routes or ensuring freedom of manoeuvre or establishing a certain number of security bases.

An alternative scenario may involve IEDs being employed as part of a terrorist campaign within a State with existing, mature capabilities and capacities to counter them, thus allowing a counterterrorism or even a criminal justice approach. In this scenario, by adopting a counterterrorism approach to such an IED threat, the goal could be degrading the IED system to such an extent that the employment of IEDs is ineffective. This may be achieved through the prioritisation of C-IED efforts which support operations to degrade-the-system. Alternatively, in this scenario, if adopting a criminal justice approach, the goal could be prosecuting the IED system through judicial processes intended to dismantle it in terms of its network of personnel, its materiel supply chains and its associated processes. This could be achieved through the prioritisation of all C-IED efforts needed to support the compilation of books of evidence to empower criminal prosecution.

In all cases, as transition between phases occurs, a shift in the approach taken by a C-IED enterprise will necessitate modification of existing or investment in new C-IED efforts that collectively make up the enterprise. The intent should always be for the C-IED efforts invested in, to mature over time, with an ultimate transition to a criminal justice approach. This need for transition is seen in the IGAD C-IED strategy,20 which states that a war model approach to C-IED may ‘prove preferable at the initial stage of countering certain IED environments but should continuously be framed in terms of and tied to goals of transition to the criminal justice model for durable C-IED capabilities and environment shaping.’

As stated in the introduction to this paper the legal framework under which a C-IED enterprise operates needs to be understood and forms the basis for how the enterprise will operate. The legal framework will most likely be determined by the way in which IEDs are being employed i.e. as a weapon system in support of criminal, terrorist, insurgency, hybrid warfare or open warfare use. In a previous C-IED Report paper,21 when discussing the topic of transition of a C-IED enterprise between phases, the related topic of the adaptation of the legal framework of a C-IED enterprise has been outlined. A C-IED enterprise may need to transition between phases due to an evolution in the IED threat requiring a retrograde transition away from a criminal justice approach. Alternatively, the maturing of a C-IED enterprise and related shaping of the IED system, through investment in and the effective and efficient management of appropriate C-IED efforts can allow the progressive transition toward a criminal justice approach. Such transition towards and away from a criminal justice approach can be visualised using a spectrum of C-IED approaches. The same concept of a spectrum of approaches to C-IED can be used to appreciate the various legal frameworks under which a C-IED enterprise can operate.

Figure 1: Spectrum of C-IED approaches.

CONCLUSION

This paper advocates for a whole-of-society approach to C-IED as being comprehensive in building a C-IED enterprise, in that it encompasses the broadest number of stakeholders who can effectively respond to and prevent IED incidents. However, it has been outlined there are often challenges to preventing the use of IEDs. Most notably the dynamic and evolving nature of an IED threat along with the need for the C- IED efforts invested in to be given enough resources and time to mature to be impactful to show a return on investment. Preventative C-IED efforts typically take much longer than responsive efforts to show such return on investment. This results in the dichotomy between wanting to invest in preventative C-IED efforts but their impact against the IED system taking too long to show benefits in terms of reducing the number of IED incidents and increasing the safety and security of the State, its citizens, and interests.

These challenges necessitate the need for a C-IED enterprise to transition between phases as it works toward preventing their use. Overall, transition between various phases, moving across criminal justice, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency and combat engineering approaches, may be needed by a C-IED enterprise. Such phases may be short, medium or long term or alternatively, they may vary in duration, determined by contextual shifts owing to evolution of the IED threat or changes in the wider security environment. This transition of a C-IED enterprise through phases may be necessary to achieve the overarching strategic goal of a comprehensive whole-of-society C-IED enterprise to effectively and efficiently respond to and ultimately prevent IED use. ■

FOOTNOTES
  1. Hybrid warfare is a military strategy that blends conventional warfare, irregular warfare, and cyber warfare with other methods like fake news, diplomacy, and economic pressure. The goal is to create ambiguity and confusion, making it difficult for the adversary to respond effectively. A State may employ IEDs as part of the irregular warfare component of hybrid warfare, through the employment of IEDs which are not attributable to the given adversary, or it is unclear who is responsible.
  2. A situation where combat is conducted in a direct and overt manner, as opposed to covert operations or guerrilla tactics. In open warfare, both sides are clearly identifiable and engage in traditional battlefield tactics.
  3. A Conceptual Framework for C-IED Enterprise Design, The Counter-IED Report, Autumn 2024 edition.
  4. Capacity refers to the means of an individual / organization to perform assigned duties effectively. This includes human capacity (individual and collective competencies and experience), physical capacity (appropriate assets) and institutionalcapacity (systems, structures and organisational culture in place).
  5. Building the C-IED enterprise to counter the IED system, The Counter-IED Report, Winter 2023/2024 edition, p. 19.
  6. Cross-cutting C-IED elements: Understanding; Preparation; Interagency and international cooperation; Informationmanagement; Adapting the C-IED enterprise. Preventative C-IED elements: National policy, regulations, and legislation; Control and security of explosives; IED precursor controls; Border controls; Intelligence led operations. Responsive C-IED elements: Defeat the device; Exploitation; Investigation; Judicial processes; Victim assistance.
  7. Building the C-IED enterprise to counter the IED system, The Counter-IED Report, Winter 2023 /2024 edition, p. 17.
  8. The IED network refers to the personnel needed to support IED incidents, including those directly involved in their supply, transport, manufacture, planning, emplacement, and execution activities, as well as those involved in indirect activities suchas financing and publicising incidents, including those who facilitate such activities.
  9. Building the C-IED enterprise to counter the IED system, The Counter-IED Report, Winter 2023 /2024 edition, p. 17.
  10. Building the C-IED enterprise to counter the IED system, The Counter-IED Report, Winter 2023 /2024 edition.
  11. Any device or material which is designed, constructed or adapted to kill or injure, and which functions unexpectedly when a person disturbs or approaches an apparently harmless object or performs an apparently safe act. Source: CCW – AP II.
  12. A device made and conducted with secrecy by design usually for an evil or illicit purpose. Note: They do not refer to anti-handling devices or other firing mechanisms fitted to ERW, or other items of explosive ordnance being used in a manner notin their intended design role which are considered to be IEDs.
  13. One example of this would be the modification in design or use of items of explosive ordnance as seen in the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine from February 2022 and in particular the use of ‘bomblets’ from uncrewed aerial systems.
  14. Intelligence derived from the processes and capabilities that collect, exploit and analyse asymmetric threat weapons systems to enable material sourcing, support to prosecution, force protection, signature characterisation and targeting of threatnetworks. Source: UN IED Threat Mitigation Handbook, Second Edition 2024, Annex A- Lexicon.
  15. According to the IGAD regional C-IED strategy, a war-model approach to C-IED involves a robust military led efforts, with the military having primacy in developing and implementing strategies and activities to counter the use of IEDs. This approach may be appropriate when IEDs are being used in asymmetric or hybrid warfare by an adversary. The strategy outlines the need to consider the advantages, disadvantages, and risks of using military personnel when considering adopting such a war model approach to C-IED. Source: Regional Strategy to Prevent, Counter and Respond to the Threat of Improvised ExplosiveDevices (IEDs) in the IGAD Region. © IGAD Security Sector Program (ISSP), www.igadssp.org
    The author has previously written that a war model approach may be more suited for high-threat IED threat environments which are non-permissive to state security forces. Source: Legally empowered C-IED enterprises, The Counter-IED Report, Winter 2023 /2024 edition.
  16. Building the C-IED enterprise to counter the IED system, The Counter-IED Report, Winter 2023 / 2024 edition, p. 21.
  17. Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) are small-scale, rapidly implementable initiatives designed to address immediate needs andbuild confidence in security, stabilization, and development contexts.
  18. A Conceptual Framework for C-IED Enterprise Design, The Counter-IED Report, Autumn 2024 edition.
  19. In all cases the approach taken should consider the threat, its scale, existing C-IED capabilities and their associated capacities, the overarching strategic goal, the C-IED efforts to be invested in and the available means for the C-IED enterprise to be developed and sustained.
  20. Source: Regional Strategy to Prevent, Counter and Respond to the Threat of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in the IGAD Region. © IGAD Security Sector Program (ISSP), www.igadssp.org
  21. Legally empowered C-IED enterprises, The Counter-IED Report, Winter 2023 / 2024 edition.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Paul Amoroso is an explosive hazards specialist and has extensive experience as an IED Threat Mitigation Policy Advisor working in East and West Africa. He served in the Irish Army as an IED Disposal and CBRNe officer, up to MNT level, and has extensive tactical, operational, and strategic experience in Peacekeeping Operations in Africa and the Middle East. He has experience in the development of doctrine and policy and was one of the key contributors to the United Nations Improvised Explosive Device Disposal Standards and the United Nations Explosive Ordnance Disposal Military Unit Manual. He works at present in the MENA region on SALW control as well as in wider Africa advising on national and regional C-IED strategies. He has a MSc in Explosive Ordnance Engineering and an MA in Strategic Studies. He runs a consultancy, Assessed Mitigation Options (AMO), which provides advice, support, and training delivery in EOD, C-IED, WAM as well as Personal Security Awareness Training (PSAT) and Hostile Environment Awareness Training (HEAT). This article reflects his own views and not necessarily those of any organisation he has worked for or with in developing these ideas. LinkedIn profile: https://www.linkedin.com/in/paul-amoroso-msc-ma-miexpe-60a63a42/

Download PDF: 27-33 Paul Amoroso – Phases within a C-IED Enterprise – COUNTER-IED REPORT, Autumn 2024

Counter-IED Report Autumn 2024